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Introduction to the River and the Controversy
From its headwaters in the mountains of western Maine,
the St. John River flows for 400 miles across northern
Maine and into Canada where it flows to the sea at St.
John, New Brunswick,

The upper 130 miles of the St. John

River flow through the remotest section of Maine' s forest
wilderness.

Most of the 2,725 square miles drained by this

upper river, in Maine and Canada, are heavily forested and
owned exclusively by the forest products industry. Land
ownership in the Upper St. John River basin follows the
characteristic pattern prevailing throughout the Maine woodlands, with vast tracts of forest acreage, owned by a few
major corporations, interspersed with the comparatively
minor holdings of many smaller companies. Four paper companies dominate tie Upper St. John River basin: Great
northern Paper Company and International Paper Company own
large blocks of territory in the headwaters area, with
scattered holdings downstream, while to the north Irving
Pulp and Paper Limited and the Pingree Heirs are the major
land owners.

Settlement has never occurred in the unor-

ganized townships of this section of Maine so the population is. sparse and no permanent communities exist. No
public roads penetrate the interior forest area. Automobile access is seasonal and restricted to a network of
private gravel roads maintained and controlled by the paper
companies. A large part of this wilderness can be reached
only by canoe, airplane or on foot.

Below its confluence with the Allagash, the wilderness
nature of the Upper St. John Valley undergoes a transition
as the river emerges from the uninhabited woodlands. Prom
at. Francis, Maine, to Grand Falls, New Brunswick, a distance of over 80 miles, the St. John defines the international boundary, flowing through a series of border towns
and rich agricultural country. At Hamlin, Maine, the river
spills over Grand Falls and begins its 200-mile passage to
its outlet in the Bay of Fundy.
There are two St* John Rivers:

the Upper river130

miles long from its headwaters to the village of Dickey, in
the Allagash plantation, and the "Lower" St. John, beginning where the river emerges from the wilderness and ending
at its outlet to the sea*
The Upper St. John is a wild river, free from pollution or obstruction, its waters and valley rich in fish and
wildlife. Yet the Upper St. John is no pristine wilderness.
Supporting a variety of wilderness associated activities,
the river has a renowned native trout fishery, supplies
critical wintering habitat for Maine's most popular game
animal, the white-tail deer, is a hunting and trapping
ground, a challenging and popular canoeing stream, and, as
a thriving timber plantation, is a source of raw materials
for the forest products industry which is Maine's largest
single employer.
The Lower St. John, on the other hand, is characterised
by human settlement and activity*

From Ft* Kent to the sea,

JtJC*.

THE
SAINT JOHN
WILDERNESS
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towns are spaced along the banks of the St* John River,
end the intervals between the towns are spanned by roads
that steadfastly parallel the rivers banks. Most of the
towns and industries dump their wastes into the river, and
certain stretches are severely polluted*

The Maine Depart-

ment of Environmental Protection, in March, 1973, announced
that it considers the Lower St* John River, in certain
parts, to be "water quality limited", a term used to describe water so polluted that lit cannot be improved to meet
standards of acceptability by the best available means of
waste treatment*

In New Brunswick, at Fredericton and

Hartland, two hydroelectric dams have converted the river
into Iong narrow lakes*

Fully two thirds of the length of

the St* John River has been "civilized" in this fashion*
Only one third of the river remains wild and intact*
Bat the Upper part of the St* John River has been
threatened in the last two decades by the forces of growth
expansion which require the consumption of the remaining "underutilized" wilderness resources at an accelerating pace.

This remote forest area of northern Maine

has been caught up in the intensifying competition between
to preserve wild areas, and demands to tap the
energy resources that these areas harbor*

Over the past

fifteen years the construction of a Federally-financed
hydroelectric project on the Upper St* John River has been
planned, debated, approved, revised, defeated, and revived*
Just as the original Federal proposal for a dam that would
have flooded the Allagash as well as the St* John provoked

protest and spurred measures to protect the wilderness
qualities of the Allagash, so the plan for flooding the
Upper St, John has provoked increasing controversy over
what constitutes the best use of that area. For, although
the St. John drains the heart of the privately-owned paper
company domain, the river itself belongs to the state of
Maine, and should, therefore, be used in a manner that
promotes the welfare of Maine people.
At this time, the Dickey-Lincoln issue is just one of
several unresolved issues which have direct bearing on the
future of the Upper St. John River.

The controversy sur-

rounding the Federal development of the upper St. John
River for hydroelectric power production is clouded by a
number of overlapping issues, each one posing a complex
problem in itself.

The Dickey-Lincoln question has become

entangled with the "energy crisis", the merits of public
versus private utility operation, and the question of who
will determine the future land-use of Maine's ten million
acres of unorganized territory. Dickey-Lincoln is just one
among many possible ways of developing the Upper St. John
Rlver. The question of whether the Dickey-Lincoln project
should or should not be constructed is really part of a
larger question:

what use of the Upper St. John River

would best promote the economic, environmental, and social
well-being of the people of Maine?
With this question as a guide, this report was undertaken primarily to evaluate the impact that the construction

of the Dickey-Lincoln project would have upon the resources
of the Upper St. John River, and to examine the assertion
that the Dickey-Lincoln project constitutes a wise use of
the public*s environmental and economic resources. Since
the case that has been made for the construction of the
Dickey-Lincoln project rest primarily on the justification
of the project in economic terms, this aspect of the project
proposal will be intensively explored*

PART I-Description of the Dickey-Lincoln Project
The concept of a Federal hydroelectric project on the
Upper St. John River grew out of the need for auxiliary
power to supplement the proposed Passamaquoddy Tidal Power
Project.

First outlined in the 1920's by an American en-

gineer, Dexter Cooper, the Quoddy tidal power project was
revived in the late 1950*s by the Department of the Interior.
Extensive engineering and economic studies proved the tidal
project to be feasible from an engineering standpoint, but
not on economic grounds.

The Upper St. John River hydro-

electrlc proposal, however, was found to be economically
sound if developed as a separate project. Of the several
Upper St* John River sites studied, the one having the greatest hydro potential was found to be Rankin Rapids, located
downstream from the Allagash and St* John River confluence.
That site was later rejected, in response to pressure
against flooding the Allagash*

The Dickey site, located on

the St* John, just upstream from the Allagash-St* John
junction, was selected as the best alternate*
According to the Department of the Interior Army
Corps of Engineers' plan, formulated in the early I960's
and authorized by Congress in 1965» the Dickey-Lincoln projeot would create impoundments behind two dams:

the main

Dickey dam, and a smaller re-regulating dam 11 miles downetream.at Lincoln School* *

The Dickey dam would be

*U.S. Department of the Interior, Report to President
John F. Kennedy. The 1 assaiaaquoddy Tidal t-owor Project and
Upcor St. Joiin Kiver i^droeloctric .Dcvelopacnt. July. 1963f
p.Vo.

9,260 ft. long, rising 340 ft. above the river bed. The
Lincoln School Dam would measure 1,290 ft. long, and 87 ft.
high.

2

Army Corps of Engineers' plans call for both dams to
be of the earthfill type, the main dam requiring 65 million
cubic yards of fill and the Lincoln School dam requiring
2.2 million cubic yards of fill. ^ Five dikes necessary
to prevent spillover from the main reservoir into the adjacent river basins, would require an additional 10 million
cubic yards of fill. *

It has been said that if built, the

Dickey-Lincoln complex would be the eleventh largest dam in
the world, the sixth largest in the United States, and in
total volume of structure, larger than the Aswan Dam. **
Preliminary surveys made by the Corps of Engineers indicate that the immense quantity of fill necessary can be
obtained locally at all sites. ^

The extensive glacial de-

posits that cover the valley would be the source of permeable and impermeable fill, while the slaty shale bedrock of
the region would provide most of the rock required for rockfills and slope protection. Where the rock slope on the
face of the dam would be exposed to fluctuating water levels
and freezing and thawing, a rock more resistant than shale
to weathering would be required. High quality, durable
U.S. Army Engineer Division, New England Corps of Engineers, Supplement to July 1963 Report: The International
Passaoaquoddy Tidal Power Project and Upper St. John River
Hydroelectric Power Development, Engineering Report.
April 1, 1964, p.3.
^Ibid., p.3. 4Ibid., p.29.
^Sleeper, Arthur, Portland Press Herald. July 18, 1965.
^U.S.Army Engineer Division, Supplement to July, 1963
Report, op. cit., p.30.

granitic rock, suitable for slope facing and for the production of concrete aggregate would be quarried at
Deboullie Mountain, an 18-mile Haul from the Dickey dam
site. ' The Deboullie granite is the only major occurQ
rence of resistant igneous rock in the region*
Hydrologic studies of the St. John River were undertaken by the Corps of Engineers to determine the potential
regulated flow available at the Dickey site. Records of
the volume of streamflow in the Upper St. John River have
been kept since 1946, at a gauging station two miles upstream from the Dickey dam site. The average annual
streamflow, which corresponds to the potential regulated
flow, at that point is 4,600 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.
Although the streamflow In the Upper St. John follows a
normal seasonal pattern, the heavy snowfall of northern
Maine, plus the lack of extensive natural storage in the
St. John headwaters, combine to produce torrentially high
flows in the spring (as high as 70,000 c.f.s.) and drastically low flows during July, August and September
(record low of 129 c.f.s.).
The function of the reservoir would be to even out
seasonally irregular streamflow, impounding the flows in
excess of the annual average, 4»600 c.f.s., to be released
during periods of lower than average streamflow*

The

^U*S.Army Engineers Division, Supplement to July 1963
Report, op. olt., p.33.
^Ibld*, p.17.
U.S.Department of the Interior, Geological SurveyWater Resources Division, Water Resources Data for Maine.
1266, Part I: Surface Water Records. l^bY. p*ll.

maximum reservoir drawdown (the maximum distance that the
water in the reservoir can be lowered when water is withdrawn for power generation) planned is 40 ft., which proTides 2.9 million acre-feet of active storage capacity*
This active storage capacity corresponds to a regulated
flow of 4,370 c.f.s*

11

Since the flow of the St. John at

the dam site averages 4,600 c.f.e*, it appears that the
Dickey dam is planned for near maximum size to control 95^
of that flow*
There ie only a limited quantity of potential energy
in a river at any one site, depending upon the volume of
streamflow. A hydroelectric dam stores the potential
energy of river flows and converts it into electrical
energy.

Kilowatts of electricity are a produot of the

amount of flow times the head (or drop)*

With an average

head of 290 ft* and the rather low average flow of 4,600
c*f*s«t there is only enough potential energy in the St.
John River at the Dlokey site to run a generating unit of
95,000 kilowatts*

This is the "prime power" in the St. John

Hirer at that point*

Operating continuously, an installa-

tion of that size could produce about 830 million kilowatthours (KWH) per year of baseload power*

12

But if, Instead of continuous operation, the potential
energy stored behind the Dickey dam were released in larger
.Anqy Engineers Division, Supplement to July. 1963
Report, op. cit., p.58.
**John £5* Wilkinson, "ITew England's Power Developments:
Fart II . . . Public Power Proposals", New inland Businoss
Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Department,
April, 1966, p*9.

quantities for shorter tine intervals, peaking power could
be produced instead of baseload power. This is the operating procedure planned for the Dickey dam, which would
have an installed generating capacity of 760,000 kilowatts.
The Dickey dam and power house is sized for operating
periods of
of U ^ .

hours each day, equivalent to a plant factor

Approximately the same number of kilowatt-hours

per year of energy (830 million KWH) would be produced
under either operating procedure, however, because the total
output is governed directly by the flow in the river.
Cast in this light, the true value of the St. John as
a hydroelectric resource appears to be less mammoth than
when generating capacity figures alone are oited. If operated at 50$ plant factor, for the production of baseload
power, a generating capacity of 190,000 kilowatts would provide adequate conversion ability.
During peaking power operation of the Dickey dam,
large surges of water would be released downstream*

The

function of the re-regulating dam at Lincoln School is to
re-Impound and release these surges evenly, 34,000 kilowatts of generating capacity would be Installed at Lincoln
School to be operated for the production of baseload power
13
at a high (87^) plant factor.
The production of baseload
power at Dickey-Lincoln appears to be coincidental to the
need for re-regulation of peaking releases and maintenance
of "1 r* ™

B

stream flows.

^U.S. Array Engineer Division, Supplement to July 1963
Report, op. cit., p.81*

The reservoir capacity of the Lincoln School dam must
be sufficient for the re-regulation of the flows from the
Dickey dam, but the size of the reservoir, and, hence, the
generating capacity of the Lincoln School power plant, is
restricted by two factors:

the re-regulating reservoir can-

not encroach upon the Dickey spillway discharge channel,
end it cannot encroach upon Allagash Palls, a natural barrier protecting the Allagash River.

These limitations on

the elze of the Lincoln School reservoir mean that the
flows from the Dickey dam and from the "uncontrolled drainage area of 1,300 miles" of the Allagash River basin, cannot be fully utilized for the production of electrio power.14
At full pool (910 ft. above mean sea level) m.s.l.
the Dickey reservoir would extend 5T miles up the St. John
River to the area known as Seven Islands. The backwater
would reach 25 miles up the Little Black River, and 23 milee
15
up the Shields Branch of the Big Black River.
A total of 110,000 acres would be used for the project.
The Dickey reservoir itself, at full pool, would occupy
889600 acres. At minimum pool, the reservoir would occupy
58,000 acres. Daily fluctuations in the reservoir pool
level would occur in response to the peaking power operation.
Approximately 2,000 acres would be required for work areas
at the <*nTn and saddle dikes, including access routes and
borrow areas. A 300-foot wide buffer zone and access strip
.Amy Engineer Division, Supplement to July 1963
Report, op. cit., p.76.
""^Ibid., p.67.

would b© acquired around the perimeter of the reservoir.
A borrow area of 20 acres at Deboullie Mountain for granite
quarrying is also projected.

16

The coordinated operation of the two dams would require excavating a new channel for the lower end of the
Allagaeh River. The deep curve in the Allagash channel,
just before it enters the St. John, would be straightened
to accommodate the tailrace from the Dickey power house.
One mile up the straightened channel, the Dickey spillway
discharge channel, which handles reservoir overflows, would
empty into the Allagash.
Almost all of the land that would be inundated by the
formation of the reservoir pool is held in large tracts for
pulpwood cutting. Ninety-nine per cent of the population
in the project area is concentrated in Diokey, a hamlet of
about 700 people, therefore, relocations will not be extensive.
Negotiations with the Canadian government would be
necessary before construction of the Dickey-Lincoln project
since two arms of the Diokey reservoir encroach upon
Canadian territory.

Moreover, the seasonal pattern of

flow in the Lower St. John would be altered by the regulation of the upper portion of the watershed by the Dickey
dam*

Although no power dams exist on the Lower St. John

within Maine, three power installations at Grand Falls,
Mactaquao and Beechwood have been built on the St* John

"u.s .Army Engineer Division, Supplement to July 1963
fleport. op. cit., p. 67-68.

ill Canada. Dickey-Lincoln would act as controlled storage
for these plants, and by smoothing out the naturally
erratio flows from the Upper river, would enhance downstream production at New Brunswick hydroelectrio power
plants by about 350 million KWII per year.

17

A modification of the Dickey-Lincoln project has been
proposed, and 350,000 appropriated to study that proposal
as of August, 1973. The modified project would produce
power primarily for a Maine market, its generating capacity
to be sized for the production of baseload power at roughly
100,000 kilowatts. The economio and engineering facts of
the smaller project can only be estimated by Interpolating
from the full-scale Dickey-Lincoln project. The changes in
the engineering features such as the size of the reservoir,
the reduction in the size of the dam, the necessity of a
re-regulating dam have not been analyzed, and, therefore,
the economic feasibility of the smaller project plan is
also unknown.

Department of the Interior, Report to President
John P. Kennedy. July, 1363, op. cit., p.73-

PART II-The Resources of the Dickey-Lincoln Project Area
Evaluations of the Dickey-Lincoln project have been
largely confined to examining the economic and engineering
feasibility of the projeot, while glossing over the environmental aspects. The procedure for determination of
the soundness of a Federal water resource projeot Is prescribed by Senate Document #97, which essentially requires
a comparison in dollar terms of the costs and benefits of
a project. 1

This approach to the evaluation of the merit

of water resource developments does not lend itself to consideration of the social costs ofc the environmental consequences of the projeot, but is strictly geared to consideration of the direct dollar costs of planning, construction,
and operation of the power plant and transmission facilities* Nowhere in the highly favorable benefit-cost
analysis for Dickey-Lincoln, prepared by the Department of
the Interior and Army Corps of Engineers, is even qualitative consideration given to the environmental costs inherent in any hydroelectric power development.
Two studies deal with the effeots of the Rankin Rapids
hydroelectric projeot on the fish and wildlife of the
Allagash and Upper St. John Rivers. Both reports were
aade before the dam site was changed to Dickey-Lincoln.
The first, a "Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Proposed Rankin Rapids Dam on the Fisheries of the Upper
^U.S.Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on rublic Work3, Public ..orl; Ay;j ropriation for
1968, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session, ilarch 13, 19o7,
P. 393*

St. John River Basin" was prepared by the Maine Department
of Inland Fisheries and Game in 1957, and revised in I960.
This report was based on a preliminary investigation undertaken to collect data on existing aquatio habitat conditions
to assess the status of the trout populations, and from this
information to make preliminary evaluations of the effects
of the proposed Rankin Rapids projeot on the fishery re2
sources of the Upper St. John River.
A second report was prepared in 1959 by the Fish and
Wildlife Service, U.S.Department of the Interior, "Substantiating Data for a Report on Fish and Wildlife Resources in
Relation to the Rankin Rapids Dam and Reservoir."

This is

essentially an expanded version of the Maine agency *s
"Preliminary Report", broadened in scope to provide information on wildlife habitat and populations as well as on the
fisheries of the Upper St. John-Allagash basins.
A

built at the Rankin Rapids site, located below

the confluence of the Allagash and St. John, would have
oaused the inundation of both rivers. The 1959 Federal report appears to have been designed mainly to justify the
relocation of the dam site from Rankin Rapids to a site on
the St. John above the mouth of the Allagash, in response
to strong public reaction against flooding the Allagash.
As a consequence, the later report is biased, since it
heavily emphasizes the fish and wildlife and recreation
2

Kendall '.Varner, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries
and Game, Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Proposed
Rankin Ha des i-om on t.:o Jis-icrios ox tl.o U - .or at. Jo.m
"RIver~Basin. 1 ^ 7 U'tevioed, l^oQJ, P*2«

losses that would be incurred by flooding the Allagash,
while nlnlnl zing the same type of losses that would be
oaused by flooding the Upper St. John. The dan site was
changed to a point upstream from the Allagash, as advooated in this report, the Big Rapids site. Later, the
Dickey site was substituted because of greater site potential for power generation.
Both reports are of a preliminary nature, although
the Pish and Wildlife Services report is subtitled "A
Detailed Report on Fish and Wildlife Resources'*. Both
call for future detailed field investigation of the Upper
St. John fishery and wildlife resources. Acoording to Mr.
Lyndon Bond, Head of the Fisheries Division of the Maine
Department of Inland Fisheries and Game, no field work
on the Upper St. John has been done since I960 and none is
planned in connection with the Dickey-Lincoln project. ^
Zn conjunction with the publication of the North
Atlantic Rerrf.onal Water Resources Study (coordinated by
the Army Corps of Engineers), in 1972, a Draft Environmental Impact Statement was issued to analyze the impact
of the water resource development projects which, according
to the economic and population projections used in the Study,
will be needed in the St* John River Basin by the year 2,000
in order to meet the development objectives set forth for
this region*

The key proposal, fulfilling several of the

^Statement by Lyndon Bond, Maine Department of Inland
Fisheries and Game, Fisheries Division, personal interview,
Januazy 30, 1973.

projeoted water resource needs, i* the development of a
huge multi-purpose reservoir on the Upper St. John which
is easily recognizable as the Dickey-Lincoln project. The
Draft Environmental Impact Statement and the North Atlantic
Regional Water Resources Study, while providing a revealing
Insight into the current Corps of Engineers' attitudes
toward the Dickey-Lincoln projeot, derives its information
about the environmental resources of the Upper St. John from
previous studies, probably the two mentioned above, and contributes no new factual information about the effect of
Dickey-Lincoln on those resources*

The Fishery of the Up cr St. John Rivor
The Upper St. John River and its tributaries comprise
a vast system of streams offering " . . . an almost unlimited amount of superior seasonal stream habitat for
brook trout." 4

Compared with the extensive system of

lakes of the Allagash, pond habitat in the Upper St. John
River basin is very limited, consisting of a few small
headwater ponds.

Thus, the existing fishery is almost ex-

clusively for brook trout. ^
Fishing pressure on tlio Upper St. John results principally from accessibility.

Roads built in connection with

logging activities have directly opened up much of the
basin to fishing and canoeing.

Stretches on the main

river and tributaries which are not easily reached from
the logging roads are accessible by canoe only during high
water.

The "Preliminary Report" describes the use of the

St. John for fishing generally as "moderate" during spring
and early summer in terms of a wilderness type of fishing,
with parts of the river and tributaries near access points
receiving more intensive utilization. ®
Brook Trout Habitat
Brook trout habitat on the Upper St. John and Its
tributaries approaches ideal conditions for the species.
^Kendall Warner, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries
And Game, Preliminary Report on the Effccts of the Proposed
Rankin Ra^ido JJ.-vn on o.:o .IgI•cries 01 the Upper St. Jolm
Rivor 13asin, l-jj7 Uevised ISuO;, p.4.
5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

Water quality is generally exoellent, free from human or
industrial pollution.

The brook trout fishery coexists

successfully with timber harvesting, the predominant land
use in the Basin.

Slltation problems have occurred in the

7

past due mainly to dredging of headwater streams in Canada.
Logging practices are responsible for some damage to the
fishery habitat by causing erosion and removal of protective
shade along stream banks, and by the change in run-off
patterns created by the deforestation of portions of the
Basin.
Both the Allagash and the St. John rivers are considered to be among the top trout streams in the country.
Limitations on brook trout habitat in the Upper St. John
are caused by two conditions:

the extreme seasonal fluc-

tuations of water levels in the river, and the obetacles
to migration at the mouths of many tributary streams.
Water levele are critical for the quality of fish
habitat because water temperatures Increase rapidly ae
flowe diminish. Brook trout cannot tolerate temperatures
over 70°F without deleterioue metabolic changes. As water
levele recede, and the water temperature reachee a critical
point, the trout seek areas of coldwater influence to carry
them over the hot summer period. The trout congregate in
well-ehaded tributaries, in spring holes, and pools at the
7 Kendall Y.arner, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries a
and Game, Preliminary Report, op.cit., p.5.

o
mouths of the tributaries during warm periods.

Due to

the concentration of the fish during low flows, the fishing
is said to be liveliest during these periods, but access to
fishing grounds by water routes is severely curtailed.
July, August and September are the critical months for
brook trout in the Upper St. John River. From a peak in
April and May, averaging between 12,000 and 14,000 c.f.s.,
river flows drop to about 3,000 c.f.s. in late Llay, and this
fairly high level is usually maintained through mid-June.
During the next three months, however, water levels are
often

too low for canoeing, and river flows may diminish

to a mere trickle. On the other hand, during seasons of
abundant rainfall, or periods of storms, the river level remains quite high.
The extreme seasonal fluctuations of water levels in
the Upper St. John, and the abrupt rise and fall of river
levels in response to rainfall result from a combination
of circumstances.

In contrast to the Allagash, which is

continuously fed even throughout the critical summer months
by a system of large and small lakes, the Upper St. John
has Inadequate natural storage capacity to maintain high
water levels. Much of the Upper St. John drainage is flat
swampland and high water tables, which is conducive to
®U.S. Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data for a Report on Fi3h and
Wildlife Kcsources in iblation to tho Rankin rapids Dam
and Rosorvoir. September, 1959* p.12.

rapid run-off and heating.

9

It is alleged that deforest-

ation has further affected the run-off characteristics of
the drainage by reducing the water retention and delayed
run-off capacities of the soil*
The other limitation on trout habitat suitability in
the St. John is the scarcity of spawning and nursery areas
above the Nine-IUle Bridge section, due to obstructions to
fish migration which block many of the tributaries above
this point. The Maine Department of Fish and Game has
checked tributaries from the headwaters of the St. John
downstream to St. Francis for obstructions to migration and
extent of good trout spawning and nursery habitat. They
found that, of nine tributaries checked between the Northwest Branch and the Nine-Kile Bridge, only two were then
pass ble.

Five were blocked by beaver dams, and boulder

cascades made two others difficult to ascend at low water
levels. Gravel "fane" formed at the mouth of the tributaries were another frequently encountered barrier. From
Nine-Mile down to the St. Francis River, forty tributaries
were checked, and twenty-five were found to be passable to
brook trout at low water.

10

Despite these limitations, the Upper St. John provides
seasonal brook habitat of sufficient quality to be considered one of the outstanding stream fisheries for brook
trout in America.

Even more renowned for brook trout fishing

^Kendall V/arner, I.'aine Department of Inland Fisheries
and Game, Preliminary Report, op. cit., p.6.
10
Ibid., p.7.

than the mainstream are two of its tributaries, the Big
Black River and the Little Black Rivor. The Big Black
with wide, shallow bouldor riffles where trout feed, has
excellent seasonal trout habitat, although water levels
beoome very low in July and August. The Little Black reputedly has even better trout fishing, despite severe
damage inflicted on the trout habitat by log drives in the
1950*8.

Pockwock and Chimenticook Streams also both pro-

vide exceptional seasonal habitat for trout.
The reservoir that would be created by the construction
of the Dickey-Lincoln dam would extend about fifty-seven
miles upstream from the dam site on the main stem of the
St. John to Seven Islands. The portion of the St. John
River remaining in the wild state would be reduced by half.
Twenty-five miles of the Little Black River would be inundated and twenty-three miles of the Big Black. The Big
Blaok and Little Black rivers would be flooded back into
Canada, resulting in obliteration of these two superb trout
fisheries in the United States. Also, several miles of
Chlmentloook and Pockwock Streams would be flooded.
The planned inundation would oause complete destruction of the existing river habitat for brook trout on the
hmHw

etem of the Upper St. John for 57 miles, the Little

Black River, and most of the Big Blaok River. Brook trout
.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit.,
p. 15.

are not well adapted to the lake environment such as exists
in a reservoir pool*

Thousands of acres of vast warm

shallows would exist within the reservoir where competitive
species better adapted to tho lake environment, such as
yellow perch, already present in the St, Jolin, would gain
12
a foothold and proliferate.
In the deeper water typical
lake species such as lake trout, whitofish and smelt might
become dominant. Not only would the brook trout fishery in
the project area be destroyed, but the trout fishery upstream from the reservoir would deteriorate as a result of
the proliferation of yellow perch, a direct competitor with
trout*

The best spawning and nursery grounds for brook

trout in the entire Upper St* John River are located within
the project area, and would be engulfed and destroyed by
the reservoir, further damaging the trout fishery upstream
of the reservoir*
Some compensation for the damage would be provided by
the lake-type fishery of the reservoir pool, since species
of fish adapted to a lake environment are not now significant in the Upper St, John basin. The adjacent Allagash
watershed,

however, contains numerous lakes and ponds.

The reservoir fishery could consist of a high-demand sport
species such as lake trout, ^

but this cannot be predicted

with certainty. The Fish and Wildlife Service report
12

U.S.Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit., p.21.
Ibid., p.25.

states:

. • it is anticipated that the reservoir pool

will provide fishery values which will only partially com14
pensate losses."
In any case, construction of DickeyLincoln would result in a complete change from the present
excellent natural river fishery for brook trout to a lake
fishery of unpredictable, but certainly lower quality.
^^U.S.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Servicet Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit.,
p. 24.
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DEER YARDS
in the
DICKEY-LINCOLN
PROJECT AREA

Wildlife Resource
The Upper St. John Rivor basin is covered by
coniferous forests, but 100 years of logging activity has
left virtually no virgin timber.

The forest type that now

predominates is the northern spruce-fir forest.

Growth is

characteristically thick, producing a dense canopy that admits little light to the forest floor. What open land does
exist, consists of abandoned farms, cleared long ago to
produce supplies for logging crews, and areas recently cutover by logging operations.
The white-tail deer is the most important game species
in the Upper St. John watershed, as in the rest of Maine.
In general, however, the harsh climate of northern Maine
and the heavily forested nature of the area, provide an environment far from ideal for the deer population. Good
browse and cover are scarce in the interior forest, even
during the milder seasons. The best deer habitat in this
wilderness forest area is offered by the transitional vegetation, the young, brushy growth bordering open lands and
the fringes of water courses. Small, well-managed timber
outs provide good deer habitat, but large clear-cut areas,
covered with deep slash, are of less value for deer.
The olimate of northern Maine is characterized by long
winters with snow cover lasting from October through April.
This is the critical season for the deer populations of
northern Maine.

During the deep snow period, the deer

gather in areas that provide both cover and ample food

supply, known as deer yards. Almost all of the deer yards
in the Upper St. John basin are looated along watercourses.
Thirty-four yarding areas have been identified within the
area that would be covered by the Dickey-Lincoln reservoir.^
The largest deer wintering areas were found to be in a tenmile stretch along the Little Black River, large areas on
Chimenticook and Pockwock Brooks, and the lower ten-mile
section of the Big Black River. Numerous smaller areas are
located along the main stem of the St. John and on the minor
tributaries.1^

The Fish and Wildlife Service reported in

1959 that, "The deer yards located within the projeot area
are of vital Importance in maintaining populations and
attract deer from outside the project boundaries.17
Thirteen thousand acres of deer yards would be obliter1 A

ated if the project were built.

The deer population in

the northern Maine forest is particularly vulnerable to
destruction of

its winter range. The Department of Inland

Fisheries and Game, having extensively surveyed deer yards
throughout the state, estimate that 38$, or one in three,
of the deer yards in the interior forest have deer in excess
of carrying capacity*

In the sections of the state where

"U.S. Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data-Rankin Rapids, letter of
transmittal, p.2.
16
Ibid., Figure 3, "Location and Extent of Existing
Deer Wintering Areas".
17
Ibid., p. 27. 18Ibid.f letter of transmittal, p.9.

the farm-woodland habitat is more predominant only one in
ten deer yards was found to be over-browsed.^
Since the yards in the project area constitute the
major deer wintering areas in the Valley, many deer from
outside the project area proper are attracted to them.
These deer would be forced to seek wintering areas outside
the project area in yards which are already overcrowded,
thus creating a secondary impact on the deer population
wintering in yards outside the project area. Therefore,
the Fish and Wildlife Services conclude, ". . . It is certain that a dramatic reduction in deer population will

20
take place within the area affected by the project."
Moose are reported to be common in parts of the Upper
St. John region, particularly in the project area. In the
past, moose, once common throughout theNortheast,were
found only in the northern Maine counties. That area
served to replenish the moose herd throughout Maine, and it
Is now said that the state's moose herd *. . .is the last
sizable remnant of the species in the eastern United
States." ^
Maine.

The moose remains a protected species in

Black bear are also abundant here and are subject

to hunting usually for their trophy value.
^State of Maine, Department of Inland Fisheries and
Game, Deer in Maine. January 1961 (Revised 1964), p.82.
20

U. S.Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data-Rankin Rapids, op.cit., p.31.
21
Ibid., p.27.

Pur-bearing animals are abundant in the Upper St. John
Valley, although fur-trapping activity in the region ie
much reduced from its past importance.

Beaver ie the most

abundant fur-bearing species and their dams are common on
the tributaries in the project area.

Flowages created by

theee dams are generally of benefit to other species, although not always to the brook trout. Mink, otter, and
muskrat are also taken by trappers, and weasel, skunk,
raccoon, rabbits, fisher, marten, and fox also inhabit the
22

Upper St. John Area.
Waterfowl breeding habitat In the projeot area has been
created largely by beaver flowages. The Little Black River
is particularly noted for providing gpod waterfowl habitat.
Black duck, blue-winged teal, wood duck, and ring-necked
duok are the varieties most common to the project area.
An informal waterfowl survey made in July 1972 by a party
canoeing the river, reported sightings of ninety ducks of
undetermined species over a period of seven days between
Red Pine Grove ten miles upstream from Nine-Mile, and
Ouellete Brook, along a fifty mile stretch of the Upper St.
John.

24

Bald eagles have been sighted in the Upper St. John
area, but the Audubon society was unable to locate a neat
22

O.S.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. oit.,
pp. 28-29.
23
Ibid., p.29.
24
John Libby, July 18, 1972,,

in the area during their recently completed census of
eagles in Maine. Ugh Lake, located in the vicinity of
Seven Islands, however, was found to offer good eagle
nesting habitat.2-*
Hunting pressure in the Upper St. John Valley, like
fishing pressure, is dependent upon access, and the increase
in hunting in recent years is largely attributable to the
expanded network of logging roads within the wildlands.
Weather conditions do limit access to a greater extent in
the northern section of Maine than elsewhere in the state,
and an early heavy snowfall can result in a sharp deoline
in the area deer kill.

The white-tail deer ie the most

sought after game animal in the Upper St. John area, although black bear trophy hunting attracts many sportsmen to
the area.

The deer harvest in the region is low in compar-

ison with the rest of the state, a result of the relatively
light hunting pressure and the scarcity of Ideal deer habitat.

A sharp upward trend in the deer kill in the Dickey-

Lincoln project area during the 1950*s became stabilized in
the I960 *s.27

As hunting pressure continues to Increase in

southern Maine, however, the Upper St. John can be expected
to receive a share of the spillover, particularly as access
roads are improved.

^statement by Richard Anderson, Executive Director,
Maine Audubon Society, personal interview, Jan. 31, 1973.
26
U.S.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data-Rankin Rapids, op.cit., p.25.
^Fred Bilbert, Llaine Department of Inland Bisherles
and Game, Deer Season 1970. September 1971; Deer Season
jL971. July, 1972.

All wildlife inhabiting the project area would be displaced and lose 90,000 acres of habitat if the DickeyLincoln project ie built. The Pieh and Wildlife Service
Study concluded that, "The displaced wildlife population
will be lost, since wildlife habitat in surrounding areas
2S

is being utilized to its maximum capacityAt the maximum pool elevation planned by the Corpe of
Engineers, 88,600 acres would be flooded. At the proposed
mlnlnrnm pool elevation, 58,000 acres would be flooded.
Development of edge-type habitat, beneficial to moet
speoies of wildlife, would normally result from the growth
of brushy cover along the cleared shoreline. The fluctuation of the water level in the reservoir, in response to the
dally peaking operation of the Dickey dam, however, would
greatly reduce the benefits by Inhibiting the type of
vegetation which would provide food and cover for wildlife.
Approximately 1,000 acres would be flooded or uncovered for
eaoh one-foot change in the water levels of the pool, with
the result that 30,600 acres could be alternately exposed
or inundated during the normal operation of the projeot.
Although this area would not be removed completely ae wildlife habitat, it would have minimal value as wildlife
habitat, and no value as deer wintering habitat.
Waterfowl breeding habitat in the projeot area would
be completely lost.

Some marshy areae would develop on

Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data-Ramkin Rapids, op.cit., p.31.

the fringes of the reservoir, but due to the fluctuations
in the pool level that will occur, they would be completely unsuitable for nesting use. Additional resting area for
waterfowl would be provided by the reservoir, but this type
of habitat is already so abundant that any waterfowl benefits from the pool will only be competing with the lakes
and ponds of northern Maine whioh are more than adequate to
meet the need.

29

The Pish and Wildlife Service found in 1959 that "The
wildlife species found within and adjacent to the projeot
area are of considerable value even though not heavily utilised at the present time. Heretofore, this wilderness area
acted as a reserve of wildlife which would be expected to
take up increasing hunting pressures as more accessible
areas beccme heavily hunted. The recent Increase in deer
hunting indicates that tapping of this reserve has begun.^
The importance of this area for maintaining deer populations by supplying critical deer wintering habitat for the
entire region has been pointed out already.

It is particu-

larly significant, according to this study, that this wilderness area has functioned as a regenerative area for
once-rare species such as the moose, the marten, and the
fisher, when their populations became drastically reduced
2

% . S . Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op.cit., p.31.
30
Ibid., p. 29.

throughout the state, due to the advance of civilization
or heavy hunting or trapping pressures. At one time the
marten could he found in Maine only in the Upper St, Johnlower Allagash valleys, ^
The stated purpose of the 1959 report, "Substantiating Data for a Report on Fish and Wildlife Resources in
Relation to the Rankin Rapids Dam and Reservoir", was to
evaluate the fish and wildlife resources of the lower
Allagash River Basin and the Upper St. John River Basin,
and to estimate the effect of the proposed Rankin Rapids
project on those resources.

The conclusions and policy

recommendations of the Fish and Wildlife Service are contained in a separate part of *;he report in the accompanying letter of transmittal.

The results of the investiga-

tion, as Interpreted by the Fish and Wildlife Service,
showed that:

"1) the proposed project would cause major

losses to fish and wildlife resources, 2) that the effects
of the project on fish and wildlife resources would extend
far beyond the limits of the projeot area • . " and
"3) that the proposed project would destroy existing and
potential values of the Allagash River which cannot be replaced by any other site in the eastern United States,"
The central reoommendation of the report is that

^

• ,

mfty^Tmnn overall benefits, including those based upon fish

^U.S.Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op.cit.,
pp, 2d2and 30.
^Ibid., letter of transmittal, p. 1,

and wildlife resources, bo realized by utilizing the Big
Rapids and Lincoln School dam sites." ^

Later investiga-

tion of the sites on the St. John located above the confluence with the Allagash proved the Dickey-Lincoln site to
be more satisfactory than the Big Rapids site.
In essence, the Pish and Wildlife Service Study concludes that the Allagash River is an irreplaceable natural
resource, and that the Upper St. John River is expendable.
The evidence supplied in the two reports, however, does not
justify this distinction between the value of the Allagash
and the value of the St. John. Only the brook trout fishery
of the Allagash is said to be "of better quality and
quantity" than that of the St. John, and even so, it is a
fine distinction between which of the two "superior" trout
streams is more so. The fact that the St. John offers more
abundant deer wintering habitat tlian does the Allagash is
not pointed out. Nearly every statement extolling the irreplaceable values of the region applies equally well to
the St. John as to the better known Allagash.
The recommendation that the Upper St. John should be
flooded "to maximize overall benefits" has no basis in the
evidence presented in the "Substantiating Data" report.
Indeed, the tone of the letter of transmittal conveys the
impression that the conclusions and recommendations were
made independently of the factual information on fish and
^U.S. Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, letter of
transmi ttal, p.2.

wildlife resources presented In the report.

This report

represents an attempt to declare arbitrarily that the environmental damage inflicted on the Upper St. John by a
hydroelectric projcct would not be serious enough to reject
euch a project. Yet, in 1955, no comprehensive evaluation
of the Dickey-Lincoln project had been made, the final dam
site had not been chosen, and thus, very little was known
about the economic value of the project.

It is clear that

the 1959 report was used to justify and advocate the tradeoff that was being made, the St. John for the Allagash, by
the Department of the Interior through its subagency the
Fish and Wildlife Service.

The construction of the hydro-

eledtrlc dam on the St, John is depicted as crucial for the
protection of the Allagash}

"The proposed plan

to use a

dam elte above the Allagash, i.e., Big Rapids or Dickey
would also forever protect the recreational value of the
Allagash River."

This weak attempt to justify the project

by equating its construction with the preservation of the
Allagash, in spite of the overwhelming evidence of the
project's adverse environmental impact on the St. John, is
a far-fetched and insidious rationalization, at best.
The attempt, in the 1959 report, to identify the
Dickey-Lincoln project with the preservation of the
Allagash, plus the pre-determined character of the conclusions to the report, prompts speculation concerning the
true motivation of the Department of the Interior in advocating the change of the dam site from Rankin Rapids to

a site upstream on the St. John.

It is not unlikely that

Interior anticipated strong opposition to a hydroelectric
project involving the Allagash, and actually never expected to succeed in "selling" the Rankin Rapids project. But,
by starting out asking for a lot, an Allagash-St. John
project, the planners succeeded in getting, not just a
little, hut the St. John River project.

Such a strategy

allowed a grand gesture of concession to be made to environmental interests, at the same time allowing opposition
to the project to run its course.

This apparent con-

cession undoubtedly did de-fuse much of the opposition to
the project, opposition that might have focused on preserving the St. John had not the Allagash also been threatened.
These suspicions are further substantiated by the lack
of consideration given environmental impact in reports made
on the Dickey-Lincoln project in the 1960*8, These reports
totally ignored the information presented in both the 1957
Fish and Game report and the 1959 report by the Federal
Fleh and Wildlife Service, The report of a two-year review
of the Paesamaquoddy-Upper St. John joint projeot Issued by
the Department of the Interior in 1963, ^

and a supple-

ment to this comprehensive report by the Department of the
Interior and the Army Corps of Engineers including an indepth study of all aspecte of the Dickey-Lincoln proposal,^
.Department of the Interior, Report to President
John F. Kennedy, The Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project.
July 1963. op. cit., p.
^U.S.Army Engineer Division, New England Corps of Engineers, Supplement to July 19<->3 Heport: The International
Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project April 1,1^64, op.cit.

make absolutely no mention of fish and wildlife losses
which would result from the construction of the DickeyLincoln project. A section entitled "Pish and Wildlife"
is included in the comprehensive Interior Corps of Engineers report, but the environmental impact of the DickeyLincoln project is not discussed at all. Instead, this
section, consisting of two paragraphs, goes to absurd
lengths to stress the environmental benefits of the
Passamaquoddy project, dismissing completely the possibility of any adverse environmental effects from the tidal
projeot.

It is significant that the well-documented ad-

verse environmental effeots of the Dickey-Lincoln project
were not mentioned, nor wae it even indicated that any
studies of the subject had ever been made.

Wilderness Camping and Canoeing
The primary attraction of the Upper St. John-Allagash
region is the opportunity for long, unbroken canoe trips,
enhanced by excellent brook trout fishing, entirely in a
wilderness setting.

It ie possible to canoe for 130 miles

on the Upper St. John, from the headwaters in the remotest
part of the north woods at Fifth St. John Fond, through
the heart of the interior forest of Maine, before striking
any settled areas.
The traditional approach to the headwatere involves a
long and arduous upstream trip from Moosehead Lake to the
Weet Branch of the Penobscot River, from the West Branch
to the North Branoh Penobscot and Bog Pond, where a canal
leade to Fifth St. John Pond. Beaver dams and uncontrolled
growth now impede the canal, but there is no automobile
ficcees. A small stream runs from Fifth St. John Pond to
Baker Lake, where a private International Paper Company
road crosses the stream.

This ie the highest point in the

headwaters that may be reached by automobile.
Probably the access route to the Upper St. John used
most commonly by canoeists is the private road of the International Paper Company known as the Realty Road. Since
the Realty Road comes in from Daaquam, following the
Oaaquam River and the Northwest Branch St. John, it affords
easy access to those wishing to begin their trip in this
section of the headwaters.

The Realty Road orosses the St.

John Just below the confluence of the Baker Branch with

the Northwest Branch, a good starting point for the run
down the main stem of the St. John. It is about eighty
miles from the Realty Road Bridge to the settlement at
Allagash by river, and the canoeist is warned that, after
putting in there is H . • .no way to return to civilization except to go downstream, and there are heavy rapids
before reaching the Allagash." ^
The run from Daaquam to Allagash is no longer the dire
test of survival that this statement implies. An exteneive
network of private paper company roads has been developed
on the west side of the river from the Nine-Mile Bridge
area downstream. Today there remains only one good sized
stretch on the main stem of the St* John River whioh is
truly inaccessible by road. All the land in the Upper St.
John Valley Is owned by the forest products Industry, however, and all roads are privately constructed, maintained,
and controlled by the landowners. Permission Is required
for their use by the publio.
The two drawbacks to canoeing the St. John River,
namely Indefinite water levels and voracious insects, make
It ideal to run the river early in the season. In middle
to late May high water is guaranteed but the flood stage
hpa passed and the blaok fly hatch has not yet begun.
Within the 2,725 sq. miles of the Upper St. John basin,
only a few lakes or ponds of any else exist, thus, natural
^Appalachian Mountain Club, The A.M.C. New Inland
Canoeing Guide. Bos ton i The Appalachian Mountain Club.

storage ie insufficient to maintain the river at high
levels during the Bummer.

During June, water levels in the

river decline until, by tho beginning of July, little more
than a trickle nay remain. High water lovels occur periodically throughout the summer, however, depending on the
amount of rainfall in the basin.
In July, 1972, I spent ten days on a canoe-fishing
r

trip on the Upper St. John with Sherwood and Lorraine Libby
and their family. The water level was consistently high
during our trip and we found the canoeing to be delightful.
The canoe run consists of a swift current, smooth for the
most part, but never tedious due to the frequently encountered sets of rocky rips. The stream bed gradient is
gentle, falling at the rate of six feet per mile with only
two really fast drops.

Two sets of difficult rapids must

be negotiated before reaching settled communities. The Big
Black Rapids, just above the mouth of the Big Black River
37
are rated Class III
and, because heavy growth along the
shore prohibits carrying these rapids, they must be either
lined or run. Big Rapids is a more difficult, notably
treacherous drop, two miles in length, but it can be carried
via the logging road which parallels the river in the lower
section.
The major canoeing challenge of the trip was the negotiation of the Big Black Rapids, because these cannot be
^Appalachian Mountain Club, Canoeing Guide, op. cit.,
p.389.

easily carried.

Lining these rapids is probably as danger-

ous as running them, since the river banks consist of vertically folded peaks of bedrock and narrow ledjes running
out into the channel.

The approach to the rapids is

marked by the steady dropping of the river bed into a
gorge, affording some of the best scenezy on the mainstem
run.
We found that, while one is aware of being remote from
organized towns and within paper company domain on the Upper
Saint John, there are some unpleasant reminders of "civilisation" . Our Introduction to the river oame at Red Fine
Grove campsite, slightly north of the Realty Road Crossing.
This campsite is marred by its location beside a gravel pit
and an airstrip, and is apparently used by the Forestry
Service as a trash dumping area. Other campsites farther
downetream, particularly those distant from road access,
were overburdened with camper's debris.
Logging activity is another Intrusion into the scenic
beauty of the river, and the wilderness quality of the canoe
ing experience.

From the Big Black River, where, in 1972,

the camper wae awakened by the grinding of chain eaws and
the crashing of trees, down to Chlmenticook Stream, cutting
operations are very muoh in evidence. On the north bank
some recently cleared areas extend down to the river1 e edge.
Although solitude is an essential Ingredient In the
experience of wilderness camping, the Libby party discovered that it is hard to find even in the "remote

interior forest" • No formal oensus of the canoeing pressure on the St. John has been taken, but our experience is
probably indicative of the popularity of the Upper St.
John for canoeing and flailing. Our first campsite, Red
Pine Grove, was shared with a group of Massachusetts sportsmen who were well satisfied with their trout catch. At
Nine-Mile Bridge, where the campsite is on the lawn of the
Forestry Service Camp, we shared the campsite with a group
of about thirty boys.

Their leader, Gardiner DePoe, takes

several groupe of young people with no previous canoeing
experience down the St. John each summer, including an allgirl group, teaching them everything from how to hold a
paddle to the use of the setting pole. Another small party
also arrived at Nine-Mile, having come in from Allagash.
The next two stops were shared with Gardiner DeFoe et al at
Seven Islands and Simmons Farm, although the open nature of
the terrain allowed relative isolation. We encountered occasional parties of fishermen along stretches of the river
olose to access roads.
Neither the visual pollution nor the lack of privacy,
however, could detraot from the impresslveness of the St.
John or from the delightful oanoeing. Towering spruce
orowd down to the edge of the river bank, scarred and hewn
as it is by the annual ice Jams. The river itself is very
broad, dark, and forbidding, an aspect that is in part
created by the ooloration of the water. Although the
water remains clear and unaffected In taete, it ie a dark

brown color that la attributed to tannic acid originating
in the swampy headwater areas*
Often heard descriptions of the "cathedral-like
splendor" of the Maine woods oan be boat understood by
canoeing a river such as the St. John. Dense walls of
spruce and fir rise on either side of the river, making
the canoeist very much aware of his Insignificance in this
vastness of trees*

The forbidding aspect of the foreet

gives the traveller renewed appreciation of the gentle,
pastoral serenity of the open areae, suoh as Seven Islands.
The scenery is rarely dramatio except in the Big Black
Bapide, but it ie consistently majestlo and is enlivened
by the frequent sighting of wildlife—deer, moose, ducks,
and even bald eagles, and the startling displays of wildflowers in the clearings.
It is possible to canoe all the way to Grand Falls,
Canada before taking out of the St. John, but it is
recommended that the canoeist end the trip in the vicinity
of Ft. Kent. Below Ft. Kent, the St. John runs through a
series of Maine border towns which introduce not only
visual pollution but serious sewage pollution and industrial wastee from potato processing plants and pulp mills.
The Canadian St. John oan be canoed, but it has two hydroelectric projects located on it with substantial water impoundments at Mactaquao and Beechwood, eo that the freerunning nature of the river has been lost.
The Upper St. John would bo flooded out as far as the

upper end of the Seven Islands area by the construction of
the Dickey-Lincoln dam.

The project area encompasses the

best canoeing, the best spawning areas for brook trout, and
the major part of the only remaining unpolluted, freerunning, wilderness section of this 423-mile river.
Flooding the Upper St. John, as proposed, would replace the current high value wilderness canoeing and fishing experience with a very large lake environment. The
recreational opportunities offered by tae reservoir pool
would not begin to compensate for the loss of the wild
river canoeing experience.

The Dickey-Lincoln reservoir

would be used primarily by boating enthusiasts or by those
seeking access to hunting areas. The "Rankin Rapids Substantiating Data" report points out another factor that
could have significant Impacts

"Construction of the res-

ervoir would also afford easy aocess by boat to thousands
of acres of previously almost inaccessible wilderness."
Proponents of the project have argued that the DickeyLincoln lake would provide a more popular reoreatlonal
facility, one which could absorb greater use pressure than
the more fragile wilderness environment. The same features
which would be offered by the reservoir pool, however, are
already provided in abundance by natural lakes and ponds
in Maine, many in wilderness settings. Opportunities for
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit.,
p.32.

long wilderness canoe trips on rivers aref however, in
far ehorter supply.

^

Certainly the scenic value of the Dickey-Lincoln lake
would not compare with the river which it would replace.
The debris generated by the 50,000 acres of timber that
would be drowned by the reservoir would not enhance its
eoenlc quality.

Mudflats would surround the reservoir ex-

cept when at full pool. When the reservoir was lowered
the full 40 ft. allowable, the recreationlsts seeking access to the lake might walk across half a mile of these badlands to reach the water.
She recreational hunting potential of the arer surrounding the reservoir would also be damaged by the elimination of waterfowl habitat, the destruction of vital deer
yarding areas, and, in general, by removing over 90,000
acres of wildlife living space. At the same time that wildlife habitat was being reduced, access to the area would be
improved, and hunting pressure would increase accordingly.
Several problems have been mentioned which detract
from the quality of the Upper St. John for wilderness recreation.

The riverside logging activity, the crowded camp-

sites, and the overflowing trash barrels, however, can all
be corrected. Additional oampsites for instance, would
permit the degree of isolation the wilderness camper seeks.
Restrictions on cutting close to the river would alleviate
Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit.,
P. 54*

another source of blight*

In other words, these

conditions

are symptoms, not of over-utilization, but of under-management for the level of use the river now receives. The
transmission facilities necessary to connect the powerhouse
to load centers in Maine and Boston, a total distance of 400
miles, would be a major source of scenic blight.

It is es-

timated that the right-of-way slashes in which transmission
lines and towers are located require over 100 acres per
mile.*®

Routing of transmission lines from the Dickey-

Lincoln site has not been finalized, but the lines and
slashes would Inevitably extend the visual and environmental impact of the project far beyond the dam site.
The quarrying of 70 million cubic yards of earth and
rook required for the dams and dikes in the violnlty of the
project, as proposed by the Corps of Engineers, also holds
tremendous potential for environmental and scenio degradation.

The main dam at Dickey alone would require 56 mil-

lion cubic yards of fill.*1

The Corps of Engineers* plans

call for the quarrying of select granitic rock at Deboullie
Mountain, 18 miles from the Dickey site. The Deboullie
Mountain area system of lakes has been identified as one of
four lake areas in Aroostook County with outstanding potential for recreational development, in an inventory made of

*°Dean E. Abrahamson, "Environmental Cost of Eleotrlo
Power", A Scientists' Institute for Public Information
Workbook. 1^70, P«
"""^TJ.S.Army Engineer Division, New England Corps of
Engineers, Supplement to July 1963 Report, op. cit., p.29.

the lakes in Northern L!aine in 1969.

The Lakes Study re-

ports that "few Liiine areas can match the scenic qualities
of this location."
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Twenty acres of Deboullio I-lountain

are slated for quarry areas for the Dickey-Lincoln project.
As access to northern Llaine and the interior forest
improve, utilization of the area for all types of wilderness-related recreation will increase. The Upper St. John
ie already absorbing the overflow of recreationists from
the Allagash wildernos3 Waterway.

Tho Upper St. John has

particular appeal for those seeking a less popular, relatively undiscovered river trip. As the Allagash becomes
more and more heavily utilized, it can be expected that
use of the St. John, as the only comparable alternative,
will continue to intensify. Conversely, if the St. John
were flooded as proposed, one of the consequences would be
increased utilization of the already crowded Allagash
Waterway.
The Massachusette and National Audubon Society have
gone on record in opposition to the construction of DickeyLincoln, contending that the present demand for wildernesstype recreation will be slight compared to the demand in
the near future.

They have urged that the Upper St. John

be declared a national wilderness waterway, since the construction of the Dickey-Lincoln project would " . . .

*2Edward C. Jordan Co., Ino., Northern Maine Regional
Planning Commission* Lakes Study, Phase I Report. April,
1969, p.18.

destroy 90,000 acres of the moot usable wilderness remaining in the Northeast."
The Pish and Wildlife Scrvice declared in 1959, referring to the expanding demand for wilderness canoeing,
hunting, and fishing, that "In the eastern United States,
this northwestern section of Maine is the only remaining
wilderness of its type, by present day ooncepts, which can
supply this demand." **

^Statement for the National Audubon Society and
Massachusetts Audubon Society, loc. cit.
Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit.,
p.34.

PARTlll-PlanningStudiesoftheDickey-LincolnProject1959-1>65
In 1956, the International Joint Commission (IJC)

1

was requested by the United States and Canadian governments to study the feasibility of constructing a tidal
power project at Passamaquoddy Bay. The IJC subsequently
appointed a study committee which, in 1959, made its report based on extensive study that took over three years
and cost approximately S3 million. 2

It was determined

that an auxiliary source of power would be necessary to
"firm" the output of the Passamaquoddy project which would
vary with the tidal cycle. The IJC

considered several

different auxiliary power sources, and selected a hydroelectric dam on the Upper St. John at Rankin Rapids as the
most favorable combination with Passamaquoddy. ^
According to the plan proposed in the IJC report, the
combined output of the two projects would produce continuous baseload power for a Maine and New Brunswick market,
with installed capacities of 300 megawatts at Passamaquoddy
and 400 megawatts at Rankin Rapids. The cost of the project was estimated to be $687.7 million (Interest 9 2 7/8;*)
the tidal project accounted for $532 million of the total
^The IJC was established in 1909» in accordance with
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, to settle questions involving the use of the waters of the St. John River basin.
^U.S.Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Public Works, Public Works Appropriations
for 1968, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st. Session, March l3»
1967, p. 3o3.

^U.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President
John F. Kennedy. July, 1963f op. cit.# p. 16.

cost. In 1961 the IJC evaluated the 1959 report and determined that while tho Passamaquoddy-Rankin Rapids Projeot would be possible from an engineering standpoint, it
would not be economically feasible at that time. ^
In May 1961, President Kennedy asked the Secretary of
the Interior, Stewart Udall, to review the IJC Report to
see what changes in fuel, engineering, and financial costs
might make the joint project economically feasible. ^ A
Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee was appointed
and it reported in 1963 that the joint Passamaquoddy-TidalUpper St. John River hydroelectric project was feasible
from both an engineering and an economic standpoint, if a
7
number of basic changes were made in the IJC plans.
The most significant change recommended was the development of different marketing assumptions, based on a Preliminary Load and Resources Study in the New Brunswick-New
England areas, made in 1961 for the Study Committee. The
Interior Plan proposed that the combined project produce
primarily peaking power instead of baseload power, and
serve an expanded market area necessary to utilize the peaking power potential from the project. The Interior Plan
visualized that the potential peaking power capacity of the
two sites would be adequate to supply most of the growth in
*U.S.Congress, House, Public Works Appropriations for
1968, op. cit., p. 3^3.
^U.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President
John P. Kennedy, July, 1963, op. cit., p. 1.
6
Ibid., p. 2. 7Ibid., p.8.

peaking requirements for years ahead in New England and
o
New Brunswick.
In accordanoe with the changed marketing plans, the
proposed installed capacity at PassaiLaquoddy was increased
to 1,000 megawatts and the proposed Dickey-Lincoln capacity was lnox*eased to
750 megawatts (one megawatt equals
Q
1,000 kilowatts).

J

Another source of project revenues

was introduced in the form of payment to the United States
government for so-called downstream power benefits to
Canadian plants on the lower St. John, that would accrue
from Increased electrical production made possible by an
increase in river storage on the Upper St. John. ^

The

Bite of the Upper St. John hydroelectric project was
changed from Rankin Rapids to Dickey-Lincoln School "in
order to protect the Allagash".
The "Benefit to Cost Ratio" for the joint project was
calculated to be 1.27 based on benefits from power, recreation and area redevelopment.
No separate economic analysis was presented for the
Dickey-Lincoln project, but this statement paved the way
for the independent Dickey-Lincoln projects

Although we

propose that the Tidal Power Plant and the Upper St. John
River Development be fully integrated, our economic
analysis clearly indicates that either project is
®U.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President
John P. Kennedy, July, 1963, op. cit., p. 75.
%bid,, p. 6.

10

Ibid., p. 6.

^Ibid., p. 41.

financially feasible and could stand on its own feet as a
separate project."

12

Immediately following the publication of the July 1963
report and recommendations, an "Army-Interior Advisory
Board on the Passamaquoddy-Upper St. John River Project"
was created to oversee the additional work needed to supplement the July 1963 report. The supplement ^ contained two
separate reports:

an economic analysis of the joint pro-

ject by the Department of the Interior, and a Corps of Engineers report on geologic site investigations on the hydrologic conditions on the Upper St. John, and preliminary
engineering layouts of the dams and generating facilities
for the Dickey-Lincoln project. For the first time, the
Dickey-Lincoln project was presented and analyzed as a
separate facility capable of independent operation.
The 1964 supplement determined the benefit-cost ratio1*
for the combined project to be 1.47* ^ but the benefitcost ratio for Dickey-Lincoln alone was much more favorable,
2«25, while the Quoddy benefit-cost ratio was marginal at
1*04*

The average annual cost of equivalent amounts of

•Department of the Interior, Report to President
John P. Kennedy, July, 1963, op. cit., p. 52.
^Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee, for
the U.S.Department of the Interior, Supplement to July 196j
Report: The International Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project and UpperSt.JohnRiverHydroelectricPowerDevelopment,August, 1964,
^Ratio of annual project benefits to annual costs,
the basic tool used in the evaluation of the economic
feasibility of Federal water resources projects.
^Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee,
Supplement, 1964, op. cit., p. 47*

electricity was found to be lower if supplied by the proposed Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln1^ source than by privatelyowned power sources,17

and even lower if supplied by an

independent Dickey-Lincoln project.
The 1964- Supplement also showed that the Federal government could produce equivalent electrical power at less
cost than the coot of power from Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln, by
building federally-financed steam plants, nuclear plants,
or pumped storage.
ever, as being

Those alternatives were rejected, how. . incompatible with the fundamental

purposes of this report.",

because they would not pro-

vide the non-power benefits of recreation and area redevelopment that would be provided by the Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln
proposal. Furthermore, alternate sources would " . . .
fail to utilize a significant undepletable resource and
eource of energy which is constantly being wasted . • .
in the flows of the Upper St. Jchn River on its course to
19
the sea."
The 1964 Supplement was circulated to Federal agencies and the Kew England governors for their review and
comment. The Interest rate for the Federal Treasury was
increased to 3 1/4i» in 1965. 20 Also, the cost of
.75 per kilowatt per year plus 3 mills per KWH
S27.50 per kilowatt per year plus 3 mills per KWH.
Composite figure provided by the Federal Power Commission
(FFC)
^Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee,
Supplement to July 1363 Report: August 1964, op.cit.,p.7.
19
Ibid., p.8.
20
U.S
.Department of the Interior, Report to President
Lyndon B. Jolmson. July, 1965, op. cit., p.4.
17

electric power from alternative priv&to sources hsd
pi

dropped substantially.

These changes caused the bene-

fit-cost ratio for the Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln project to
decline to 1.19. 22 The benefit-cost ratio for DickeyLincoln declined as well, but remained very favorable, at
23
1.81. J

The separate Quoddy project's benefit-cost ratio

declined, however, below unity, to 0.86.2^

In terms of

at-market electricity for 1365, it was estimated that
power from an independent Dickey-Lincoln project would cost
$15.50 per kilowatt-year and 3 mills per KWH (kilowatthour);

equivalent power from a private utility, serving

the same market, cost $23.50 per kilowatt-year plus 2.6
mills per KWH;

while power from the joint Quoddy-Dickey-

Lincoln project would cost £36.72 per Kilowatt-year and
3 mills per KWH.

27

In their reviews, the Department of Commerce, the
Federal Power Commission, and the Treasury Department
pointed out that the Quoddy tidal project was clearly uneconomical, but recognized the economic feasibility of the
Dickey-Lincoln project.

On the basis of the approval and

concurrence of the agencies reviewing the Supplement in
1965, the Department of the Interior made five recommendations:
.Department of the Interior, Report to President
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project
and Upper St. John River Hydroelectric Development. July,

1S65, p.5.
§?Ibid., Federal Power Commission review, p.6.
23
Ibid., p.6. 24 Ibli> p - 5 - 25 I b i d > f p # 6
26

Ibid., p.5.

27

Ibid., p.6.

1) Immediate authorization, funding and construction
of Dickey-Lincoln and early completion ox necessary arrangements with the Canadian government.
and possible redesign of the Passamaquoddy project.
3) Preservation of the Allagash river.
4) Improvements to Roosevelt International Park on
Campobello Island.
5) Continuation and intensification of a comprehensive program for th$.multiple-useof the area's
natural resources.
The Dickey-Lincoln proposal was the only recommendation that had any substance. The others were padding designed to bolster the Importance of the Dickey-Lincoln
project as the 'key' to a regional resource development
program.

The Dickey-Lincoln proposal recommended for auth-

orization was the 1964 Corps of Engineers* plant

at the

Dickey dam, a generating capacity of 760 megawatts, operating for brief periods each day would generate 750 million
KWH of peaking power annually. At the Lincoln School dam
an Installed capacity of 34 megawatts would be operated
2o
to produce 260 million KWH annually of baseload energy. *

.Department of the Interior, Report to President
Iyndon B. Johnson, July, 1965» op. cit., pp. 4-5.
^^Passanacuoddy-St. John River Study Committee,
Supplement to July 1963 Report, August, 1964, op. cit.,
pp. 23-24.

PART IV - Congressional Action on
1965-1972

Dickey-Lincoln

Acting on the recommendation of the Department of the
Interior, President Johnson, on July 11, 1^65, asked Congress for the immediate authorization of the Dickey-

Lincoln Project at a cost of $227 million.

On the motion

of Senator Muskie, a member oi' t^.u Senate Appropriations
Committee, a provision authorizing the Dickey-Lincoln project was Included in the omnibus Public Works Bill. Unlike
Other projects in the $1.9 billion bill, the Dickey-Lincoln
provision was included without hearings. ^
On July 27, the omnibus Public Works Bill passed the
2
Senate, including the Dickey-Lincoln measure*
Reportedly,
no reference was made to the Maine Project in the Senate debate on the Public Works Bill, and the Maine senators did
not participate in the floor deliberations. ^
The House of Representatives did, however, assign its
Public Works Subcommittee to review the Senate measure and
hear-

testimony.

Arguments in favor of Dickey-Lincoln were

heard from the Governors of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont,
Maine Congressmen Hathaway and Tupper, Interior Secretary
Udall, and spokesmen for the Maine and National Rural Elec-

tric Associations.

Supporters of the project testified that

the Dickey-Lincoln project would provide a source of inexpensive electric power for E2aine and New England and bring

Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1 W .
op. cit., p.3o5»
2
Ibid.
^Bangor Daily News, July 28, 1965.

economic benefits to a depressed area as well. *
Opposition to the authorization of the project in the
Subcommittee hearings came from two sources:

the New

England private electric utilities, and the supporters
of the proposed Maine Power Authority. No testimony opposing the project on environmental grounds was given in
1965.
The chairman of tne Electric Coordinating Council of
New England (ECC), Albert Cree, spoke for the nineteen
major electric utilities, all private, of New England. Mr.
Cree claimed that electric power equivalent to the amount
produced by Dickey-Lincoln could be produced
. ..

by a combination nuclear-pumped

storage plant for 71 million dollars, capital cost, based
on the costs of the two power plants then under constructlon in southern New England.

J

The president of Central

Maine Power, Y.illiam Dunham, represented the seven major
Maine private electric utilities. Mr. Dunham stated the
inveetor-owned utilities would meet the needs of the state
for baaeload and peaking power, and do it at lower cost
than Dickey-Lincoln, including taxee, from which Federal
projects are exempt. He predicted that, between 1965 and
1980, barring further inflation, private utilities would
decrease Maine electric rates by 30$. This would be
accomplished by the economies of scale that would be

^Portland Press Herald, August 10, 1965.
5

Ibid.

realized by expansion of the transmission grid, the

strengthening of the Maine systems interconnection with
the New England energy pool, r_nd the construction of on
atonic plant in Maine in tne 1970*s.6
To reinforce their claims, CUP announced a rate cut
for domestic consumers, the second in two years, shortly
before tho final vote on the 1965 Public Works Bill.
The Citizens Committee for a Maine Power Authority
also appeared in opposition to Dickey-Lincoln.

They con-

tended that their proposal to create a state power authority to finance the construction of a hydroelectric project
at Big Rapids on the Upper St. John River, could produce
and deliver power at lower costs than either the Federal
7
proposal or a private utility alternative.
The majority of the House Public works Committee
recommended the authorization of Dickey-Lincoln. A motion
to strike the project from the omnibus bill was rejected by
a tie vote in the House.

In October the House passed the

Senate version of the 1965 Public works Bill as recommended by a House-Senate Conference committee, by a vote of
207-185.

Twenty out of twenty-five Hew England Congress-

men voted against the omnibus Bill, primarily because of
their opposition to the Dickey-Lincoln authorization
measure.8
^Bangor Daily Kows, August 17, 1965.
"^Portland Press Herald, August 11, 1965*
®Bangor Daily Hews, August 17, 1965.

To fund pro-cons true ticn planning of the DickeyLincoln project, $724,000 was appropriated for 1966, and
31,100,000 for 1967-

9

A special study by the staff of the

House Public Works Subcommittee was ordered in September,
1966 to

. . determine the economic feasibility and sound-

ness of the proposed Federal investment of 3218,700,000."

10

in the Dickey-Lincoln project. The Staff Report as entered
into the record of the March 1967 Subcommittee hearings on
the Public Works appropriations for 1968.
Congress subsequently denied the appropriation of
$1,676,000 to complete preconstructlon planning, and has
refused every year since 1967 to grant more funds for the
Dickey-Lincoln Project, although well over $2 million had
been spent in actual planning when funds were cut off.
In order to circumvent the persistent opposition of
the private utilities to the Dickey—Lincoln project, in
1971, Representative William Hathaway proposed a compromise plan. According to the Hathaway Plan, the generating
capacity at the dams would be reduced to 100 megawatts,
and would produce baseload power for a Maine market. The
transmission of peaking power to southern New England
would be dropped, and the project purposes would be extended to include irrigation for Arroostook County potato farms.
In 1971, Congress authorized a study of the Hathaway
%angor Daily News, August 17, 1965.
•Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968
op. cit., p. 382.

Plan, but failed to appropriate the $100,000 requested to
finance a feasibility study.

Soon after, the Senate ap-

proved $800,000 for the original project, but later gave in
to House pressures and completely dropped the Dickey-Lincoln
Project from the 1972 Publio Works. 1 1

The following year,

basically the same pattern was repeated.
In 1973, the House approved 350,000 to fund a study of
the compromise Hathaway Plan for Dickey-Lincoln. After considering an $800,000 appropriation to revive the full-scale
project, the Senate concurred with the House action.
If the results of a study, by the A m y Corps of Engineers, of the economic, engineering and environmental
feasibility of the compromise Dickey-Lincoln project are
favorable, the compromise project stands a better chance of
receiving funding than does the full-scale project. Support for the full-scale project has waned within the Maine
congressional delegation.

Senators Hathaway and Muskie re-

main committed to the original Dickey-Lincoln plan, but
prospects for funding are very dim, given the persistent
and powerful opposition of the private electric utilities
Of New England.

Since opposition by the private electric

Industry has been the major obstacle for Dickey-Lincoln,
the revised marketing plan of the compromise DickeyLincoln should quell resistance from that quarter. Presumably only Maine's eleotric industry will continue to
oppose the smaller projeot.
11

Itelne Times. September 24, 1971.

PART V - Examination of the Economic Justification Put
Forth for Dickey-Lincoln
In the years Immediately following the authorization
of Dickey-Lincoln by Congress in 1965, two significant
studies were made of the economic aspects of the project:
one by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, and one by the staff of the Subcommittee on
Publio Works, House of Representatives.
Subcommittee on Public Works Staff Study
In September, 1966, the House Committee on Appropriations asked that a special Staff study be made of the
economic feasibility and soundness of the proposed Federal
investment of $218,700,000 in thB Dickey-Lincoln project.
The Public Works Subcommittee Staff was asked to include the following in their research:
1) a review and appraisal of the completeness and
adequacy of the study conducted by the Corps of
Engineers and the Department of the Interior on
which the report was based recommending the projeot for authorization.
2) An analysis of the soundness of the estimated
allocation of the annual project benefits to
power, flood control, and area redevelopment.
3) An analysis of the soundness of the cost estimate
of $218,700,000.
4) An appraisal of the plans for the marketing of
power, including the proposed power rates to be
charged and the payout schedule.
5) A comparison of the estimated cost of power production under the project with costs under alternative means, including steam plants, nuclear
^U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 382.

1

5)(continued)
plants, and pumped storage and nuolear combinations.
6) An overall appraisal of the need ar<d significance
of the project in ::.eotinpower requirements in
the light of the expansion program planned by the
New England utilities." 2
In the course of its investigations, the Subcommittee
Staff consulted a variety of informed sources and sought
to obtain the views of those opposed to the project, as
well as those who had planned and promoted it. Members of
the Staff discussed the projeot with officials of the
Federal Power Commission, the Department of the Interior,
and the Army Corps of Engineers.

The Departments of Com-

merce, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget were also consulted on their views. Meetings were held with officials
of New England's private electric industry and with municipal electric utilities and rural electric cooperatives.
The opinions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Maine
state officials, and engineering and constructions firms
were also solicited. ^
The Staff report on Dickey-Lincoln was entered in the
record of the Subcommittee hearings on the Public Works
Appropriations for 1968.
The

Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study
In 1966, the "New England Business Review", a publi-

cation of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, produced a
study of "the quest for low-cost eleotrlcity" in New
Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 382.
3
Ibid.

England.

One issue examined the past, current, and pro-

spective developments within the private utility industry

of New England; the next examined four public powerdevelo
New England.

The principal finding concerning the private utilities

was that rapid technological advance

production and operational coordination would substantially reduce power costs by 1972 "barring further inflation".^
The "Business Review" predicted that through the efficiency of an interconnecting extra-high-voltage transmission
network, combining production from all major New England
generating sources on a one-system basis, the cost of
electricity to consumers should decline by as much as 251*
from 1966 price levels. ®
In judging the merit of a public power proposal, the
"Business Review" suggested the following factors should
be

given consideration, in addition to t

"Would the proposals foster worthwhileintersystem
coordination and assure high standards of service?
Would they fill a distinct need in some parts of
the market?
What ere the ultimate effects on taxpayers?
*John M. Wilkinson, "New England*e Power Developments: Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", New England
Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research
Department, Apri1, 1966, p.2.
5
Ibid.
^John M. Wilkinson, "New England Power Developments:
Part I . . .The private Utility Industry", New England
Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research
Department, February, 1966, p.17.

Is economic efficiency the sole criterion in judging a development, or are there over-riding social
purposes of greater weight^
Will utility commission regulation of a natural
monopoly assure the lowest possible power rates, or
is regulation by competition also necessary?" 7
Within this framework, four public power proposals
were considered]

the Dickey-Lincoln Federal hydro-

electric project, Canadian hydroelectric import through
Vermont, mine-mouth thermal power from Appalachia, and a
nuclear power plant in Maine built by a State Power
Authority*

While less concerned with the validity of the

economic analysis of Dickey-Lincoln than the Staff report,
the "Business Review" set forth a number of factors important for evaluating the contribution of these proposed
public power developments to the problem of reducing
power rates in New England.

7

John M. Wilkinson, "New England•s Power Developments s Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", New England
Business Review, op. cit., p.2.

Federal Evaluation Standarda
Federally-financed water resources projects are evaluated according to a set of standards embodied in Senate
Document #97. In the procedures outlined in S.D. #97, it
is required that three tests be applied before Federal investment in a project can be considered a worthwhile allocation of public funds. First, the "comparability test11
requires that the project be the least costly means of
providing power, the cost of equivalent power produced by
alternative means being compared on the same terms, that
is, at the same Interest rate and with the same tax exemptions*

Second, the "benefit-cost" test asks if the bene-

fits from the project exceed its costs. For this purpose,
benefits are defined as the prices consumers would pay for
equivalent services if the projeot were not built, and
costs as the investment required to construct, operate
and maintain the project. Third, although the project may
not pass the first two tests, fulfillment of important
socio-economic objectives, such as regional growth and relief of unemployment and poverty, may justify a projeot
Q
not justifiable on purely economic grounds.
She comparability test essentially oompares the oost
of a publio projeot with the oost of private alternatives
in terms of goods and servioes, assuming the same type of
financing for each.

If the alternatives prove less cost-

ly by this test, theoretically our "national resources
®V711kinson, "New England^ Power Developmental
Part II . . .Publio Power Proposals", op. oit., p.11.

t>5

stock" would be more efficiently used by providing the ser vice by the alternate means.

The benefit-cost test i8 a

comparison of the cost of the project services when proTided by the project and by alternatives with all the market place money costs figured in. Thus, the higher

interest

rates and taxes paid on privately-financed projects are
claimed as project benefits, since the consumer would have
to pay these oosta to obtain the equivalent service by alternative means.

If more than a single service ie provided by

the project, such as flood control provided by a hydroelectric dam, the alternative costs of providing that servioe,
by building a flood control structure, are also claimed as
project benefits. ^
The benefit-cost measure ie by far the most important
and widely used tool for water resource project evaluation.
The comparability ratio is rarely even calculated. If a
project passes the tomparability test, it automatically
passes the benefit-cost test as well. The benefit-cost
ratio may be favorable, however, even though the comparability teet is not.

That is, a private alternative which

oosts less than the publio project when both are assumed
to be tax exempt and financed at the same Interest rate,
may oost more than the public project when taxes and the
higher interest rate which private utilities must pay are
taken into acoount. By strict definition, such a project
is not eoonomloally feasible.

Even if a projeot does not

mast the above criteria, it nevertheless may be justifiable

^Wilkinson, "New England*s power Developmentst
Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", op. cit., p.11.

on the grounds that it is the most efficient means of stimulating the economy of an area, or of alleviating poverty
and unemployment.

Project Coat Analysis
In order to comply with the House Public V.'orks Subcommittee Staff'b request for an up-to-date benefit-coat
ratio, in Octobor 1966, tho Array Corps of Engineers prepared a new project cost analysis for Dickey-Lincoln.
When the Staff study was conducted, and the 1966 cost estimates were current, theflewEngland Division of the
Corps had begun the preliminary stages of advanced engineering and design for Dickey-Lincoln. Approximately two
more years of advanced planning would be required as part
of a total of four years of pre construct! on planning. The
oost of Dickey-Lincoln increased only $2 million between
1964 and 1966, but certain unit costs changed substantially*

Although estimates for construction costs might

be expected to fluctuate less widely as the more detailed
phases of planning proceeded, the Staff study added a
cautionary notei

"Although the Corps cost estimate of

$229,300,000 to construct the Dickey-Lincoln project is
the best available at this preliminary stage of engineering and design, the final configuration of this project
has not been determined and future engineering and design
refinements will have an effect on costs until the stage
of final contract letting."

10

In order to carry out the requested evaluation of the
reasonableness of the Corps construction cost estimates,
the Staff consulted a variety of sources!

the Tennessee

.Confess, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op* cit., p. 3^8.

Valley Authority, a pftHvate engineering firm, and the New
England Electric Coordinating Council (ECC). These coneultations confirmed the fact that final costs can only he
ascertained when detailed plans are available. A large
number of variables are involved in estimating construction oosts, such as climatic conditions, the length of the
work year, the type of equipment used, the effioiency of
the contractor, the availability of good fill materials,
the amount, type, and cost of labor, the cost of construction materials, and the unpredictable escalation of costs.
Different cost estimates were arrived at by different estimators because of the difficulty of precisely determining the effects on costs of these factors.

The Staff

recognized that basically the cost estimates depend on the
assumptions made by the estimators, and that judgment
factors are influential since the estimation of costs is
imprecise.

11

On the basis of a so-called "limited review" of the
Corps construction cost estimates for Dickey-Lincoln, the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) agreed the major items of
cost were accounted for in the Corps calculations, and
that the construction cost estimates seemed reasonable for
1966.

12

A firm of consulting engineers, the Charles T. Main
Co., of Boston, retained by the ECC to review the Corps
construction cost estimates of August 1964, olalmed that
^^TJ.S.Congress, Public WorkB Appropriations
for 1968.
op. cit., p. 390. '
^—r
*
12
Ibid, p. 390.

Dlokey-Llnooln Project: Estimate of Coat3
as of October, 1966
(In thousands of dollars)
Lincoln School
Dickey
Projoct
Project

Total

5,214
1.738
11,050
67,114
, 11,414
. 52,385
, 19,470
560

400
1,238
150
6,490
5,307
476
50

5,614
2,976
11,200
73,604
11,414
57,692
19,846
610

728

208

936

•153*673

14,319

167,992

21,361

1,961

22,322

Engineering, design,
eupervlslon, administration 19,079

1,720

20,799

194,113

18,000

212,113

16,100

1,100

17,200

210,231

19,100

229,313

Buildings, grounds,

Interest during construction

-

TOTAL DICKEY-LINCOLN COST* ~ $229,313,000

• Not including transmission costs.
Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriation,
Subcommittee on Publio Works, Public Works Appropriations
for 1968, Hearings, 90 th Congress, 1st Session, Llarch,1967,
p. 387.

Benefits and Costs of Dickey-Lincoln Compared
Sources U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Public Works, Public Works'Appropriations for 1968, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st. Session,
March 13, 1967, p. 303.
Project Costs
Dickey-Lincoln construction coot
(including interest at 3 l/8;» during
construction)

$229,313,000

Transmission system cost
(including interest at 3 1/8^ during
construction)
Total construction cost

82.515.000
$311.828.000

Total at-market annual project cost using
100-year period of analysis and 3 l/8£
interest rate:
Annual interest and amortization cost
$311,828,000 x 0.3276 (3
for
100 years)
Annual operation and maintenance costs:
Dickey-Lincoln
Transmission system
Total annual at-market project cost

$10,215,000

1,095,200
862.000
JiSiiZ^iiSS

Project Benefits
Annual flood control benefit
Annual area redevelopment benefit
Annual power benefit, including
downstream energy benefit
Total annual project benefits

$40,000
467,000
18.798.000
$19.305.000

Ratio of annual project benefits to annual project costs:
$19,305,000 „ , 5 g

$12,172,000

the Corps had underestimated the cost of the Dickey dam
alone by $70 million.

Main alleged that the oost of fill

was understated by $34 million, and that the climatic conditions of Northern Maine would shorten the working season
to 4 1/2 months, substantially increasing construction
costs. The Corps demonstrated, however, to the apparent
satisfaction of the Subcommittee, that their fill prices
were realistic, although conservative, and that climatic
conditions had been taken into account.
The Corpe 1966 oost estimate of $229,300,000 for
Diokey-Lincoln ie based on construction costs for that
year, in compliance with S.D. #97, not on projected costs
for the initial year of construction. The T7A advised
that the total Corps oost estimate, minus the interest,
should be escalated at about

per year, with the likeli-

hood of higher rates of escalation after 1966. The 4?t per
year figure was an average of the rates at which the oosts
of land, labor, construction equipment, and installed
equipment were increasing.

Since about six and one half

years would be required for the construction of the DickeyLincoln project, according to the Corps, 4# cost increases
eaoh year would amount to about $55 million, or a final
projeot construction cost of $267 million, without interest.
Assuming escalation at 5.^, the final cost would be $280
14
million without intereet.
^^.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 397.
14
Ibid., p. 394.

An increase in the Federal interest rate would cause
a corresponding Increase in the final project costs. That
rate ie estimated annually, by a formula set up by Congress for multi-use water resources projects, related to
the return on U. S. Treasury Bonds with terma to maturity
of fifteen years or longer.

The Corps calculation of in-

terest during construction ofDickey-Lincolnused the 1966
rate of 3 l/8# per year, or $17,200,000 for the entire projeot*

The Staff noted that an increase in the interest

rate to 4 5/85* would result in a total interest for the
project of $25,400,000 and an interest rate of 5 1/27& (the
Treasury estimate of the true cost of borrowing money in
December 1966) would produce a total interest cost of

130,270,000.

15

Federally-financed water resource projects are exempt
from local, state and Federal taxes, eo increasing levels
of taxation would affect the Dickey-Lincoln projeot costs
only insofar as they contribute to increasing the costs of
land, labor, and equipment. It might be said that this Is
the only faotor that can be counted on to remain stable
when making estimates of future project oosts.

•Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968>
op. cit., p.394.

Analysis of Project Benefits

In the economic analysis of the Dickey-Lincoln project upon whic
benefits attributed to Dickey-Lincoln were derived from
three sources flood control, area redevelopment, and
power.

The so-called "non-power" benefits assigned to the
project are minor, $510,000, compared to benefits from

power of $18,800,000 annually.

At various times since

the project was authorized, other non-power benefits have
been added from recreation, and it has been proposed that
Irrigation benefits also be added.
Non-power Benefits
The annual flood control benefit to be derived from
Dickey-Lincoln, $40,000, is a measure of the cost of two
flood control dikes, averaged over 100 years. At 1963
prices, the two dikes that would be required were estimated to cost approximately $1,060,000. Between 1933 and
1963 Fort Kent has suffered seven "consequential" floods,
17
with damages averaging $47,800 per year. ' In May 1973,
floods on the St. John River caused damages estimated at
18

$2,500,000 in Fort Kent alone.
Annual area redevelopment benefite of $467,000 credited to Dickey-Lincoln represent the "wages paid during construction to pereons employed from the pool of unemployed
.Congrass, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 409.
17
Ibid.# p. 406.
^Portland Press Herald. May 4, 1973.

and underemployed workers residing within a reasonable distance of the project.

and

wages

paid

operation and

maintenance personnel for 15 years after the project begins operation, averaged over a 100-year period.
A total of 11,200 man-yeare of labor would be required to build the Dickey-Lincoln project, according to
the Corps of Engineers.

The Corps determined that a maxi-

mum of 550 unemployed and underemployed workers could be obtained from the Fort Kent area.

The local labor pool would

supply 840 man-years of semiskilled and 3,110 man-years of

common labor, and 35 from the local labor pool would be em
Ort
ployed in operation and maintenance jobs.
All of the 2,700 man-years of skilled labor required
for the construction of Dickey-Lincoln would have to be imported. Over the nine yeare required to construot the projeot, the Fort Kent area would supply the total requirement
for semi-skilled and common labor for the first three years
and the last year. For the four middle years, a large part
of the semiskilled and oommon labor force would also have
to be Imported.

Imported labor, In all categories of skill,

would be required to perform 1,100 man-years the fourth
year of construction, 1300 the fifth, 1800 the sixth and
seventh, 900 the eighth, and none during the last year.
Presumably, some portion of this labor would be imported
from Canada.

^

•Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968,
op. cit., p. 407.
21
^Ibid., p. 407
Ibid.

The long-term area redevelopment benefits from employment on the dam construction are debatable, since having a
large temporary labor force in the area, for a few years,
with many left unemployed in the wake of construction,
couldhave an adverse effect on the local economy, A
"peak" in the number employed would be reached in the
eighth year of construction, according to the Corps plan*
followed by a sharp decline. The Department of Commerce,,
in its comments on the August 1964 Corps and Interior re port, advised some gradual phasing out of construction in
order to achieve the projected area redevelopment bene22

fits.

It has been predicted that the project would

have only a temporary positive impact on the area's economy,
producing a "boom" as services and trades are overextended
to satisfy the demands of the Influx of temporary
23 labor,
and a "bust" when construction was completed. J
A study of the social and economic consequences of the
Dickey-Lincoln Project was made for the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Maine Agricultural Experiment Station in 1966 • The purpose of the study was "to
present a still picture of the selected areas as of the
summer of 1966," 2 * and to collect data which would provide
a base for subsequent analysis.

The focus of this

•Department of the Interior, Report to President
Lyndon B. Johnson. July, 1965, op. cit., U.S.Department of
Commerce Review, op. cit., p. 7.
2
% . S . Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968,
op. olt., p. 408.
2
*Louis A. Ploch and Nelson L. LeRay, Social and
Economic Consequences of the Dickey-Lincoln school Hydroelectric Power Development on the Upper St. John Valley
Malne—Phase I •"Preconstruction, March, 1968, Preface.

preliminary phase of the research program was defined i
"What happens to a relatively culturally and physically
isolated rural, resource-oriented area, and to its people,
when it becomes the site of a publicly financed project
which temporarily Increases the population by many hundreds of persons?M

25

Of the five towns surveyed, 43t* of

the households had incomes under S3 % 000 a year. The survey found that, except for the people of Allagash, where
most of the population would have to be relocated, the
residents of the Upper St. John Valley were generally looking forward to the construction of Dickey-Lincoln as a
means of reversing the trends of poverty, unemployment and
pC
outmigration.
There is certainly no doubt that flood oontrol benefits would accrue from the conetruotlon of a dam above Ft.
Kent. No claim is made that area redevelopment benefits
would result from the attraction of industry to the area
or from increased tourism if Dickey-Lincoln were built.
The alleged area redevelopment benefits may or may not be
valid, but consideration of non-power benefite serves two
purposesi

one, to pad the benefit side of the benefit-

oost ratio, thus offsetting costs} and two, to designate
a portion of the projeot costs as nonreimbursable In the
project repayment analysis, thereby lowering the rates
that must be charged for electricity to repay the
2

^Louis A. Plooh and Nelson L. LeRay, Social and
Economio Consequences.—Phase I. Preconstruction. Llarch,
1968, op. cit., p. 1.
26
Ibid.f p. 38.

the investment cost of the project.

In general, non-

power benefits serve to enhance the project's apparent
value, without adding anything to the ooet of the projeot.
Power Benefits
The $18,798,000 in annual power benefits from DickeyLincoln constitutes 96<f> of the total benefits. DiokeyLincoln power benefits were calculated in accordance with
S.D. #97, which states in part:

"The value of power to the

users is measured by the amount that they should be willing
to pay for such power.

The usual practice is to measure

the benefit in terms of the cost of achieving the same result by the most likely alternative means that would exist
27
in the absence of the project." ' The Federal Power Commission interprets "the most likely alternative means" as
the least costly alternative.

S.D. #97 also specifies that

when computing costs of alternative sources of power to be
constructed with private financing, which alternatives to
Dickey-Lincoln would be, the costs must include the interest, taxes, insurance and other cost elements
actually in28
curred by such privately-owned projects.
The Subcommittee Staff asked the Federal Power Commission to study the estimated cost of power from alternative
sources (so-called "power values") ae compared with the
cost of power that would be produced by Dickey-Lincoln.
^U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. oit.f p.409, citing Senate Document 97, Section V-_t)-5.
.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968,
op. cit.• p.398.

The Department of the Interior's proposed plan for marketing Dickey-Lincoln power waa considered in making this comparison, since marketing assumptions about the future type
(peak or baseload), quantity and location of demand affect
the cost of producing and transmitting power.

Therefore, a

valid alternative must meet the needs of the same type of
market.

The Department of the Interior, which would market

Dickey-Lincoln power, proposed to sell 100 megawatts of
baseload power at 50^ system load factor in Maine, and the
remaining 600 megawatts of power in the Boston area as peaking power, at 10^ load factor.
Unit costs for the two types of power were derived and
converted to at-market cost of power delivered to Bangor,
Portland and Boston, using both privately and P^derally
financed sources of power.

The at-market charges for Dickey-

Lincoln power were computed to be $15. per kilowatt per year
for capacity plus 3*0 mills per KWH (kilowatt-hour), equivalent to 9. total cost, with the above marketing plans, of
6.4 mills per KWH for 50^ load factor power delivered to
load centers in Maine, and 20.1 mills per KWH for 10# load
factor power delivered to Boston.

The computation of

these power rates is explained in the "Projeot Payout
Schedule" section.
The Federal Power Commission determined after examination of power costs from several types of alternatives,
that a combination of a private conventional steam plant in
29

u.s .Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968,
op. oit., p. 398.
3
°Ibid., p. 399.

if
Maine and a private pumped storage development in the
Boston area would provide the lowest cost private alternative to the power that would be produced by the DickeyLincoln project. 3 1

No publicly financed alternatives

were considered, since no public power facilities exist in
New England, and hypothetical sources are not considered
valid alternatives.

Fixed charges for the private alterna-

tives included interest at 7$, insurance, federal, state,
and local taxes.

50# load factor power from the alterna-

tive private Maine baseload plant required rates of $23.50
per kilowatt per year for capaoity plus 3.1 mills per KWH.
The cost of power produced by the alternative private peak
ing power facilities in the Boston area, operating at 10#
load factor, was estimated to be $19*50 per kilowatt per
year plus 4.5 mills per KWH.

J

It is evident from the comparisons made by the Staff
that

. . the privately financed alternates cannot com-

pete oostwise with the Federal government in providing
Identical facilities for power supply whether it be conventional steam, nuclear steam, or a pumped storage hydro
development."

33

In 1966, the ECC also prepared estimated costs of
power from private source alternatives.

The ECC calcula-

tion of the lowest priced alternative for 50£ load factor
power delivered in Maine was based on the 600 megawatt
Millstone Point nuolear plant in Connecticut, with at-market
3i

U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 401.
32
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Ibid., p. 404
Ibid., p. 402.

cost of $19.14 per kilowatt per year plus 1.9 mills per KWH.
When the ECC's estimate was adjusted by the Staff to include realistic transmission costs and losses to Maine,
however, it was increased to $25.14 per kilowatt per year
plus 1.91 mills per KWH, which would require at-market
rates of 7.7 mills per KWH for baseload power in Maine.
The ECC cost estimates of alternative power costs of
peaking power for the Boston area, based on the Northfield
Mountain pumped-storage project in western Massachusetts,
wae $10.91 per kilowatt per year plus 2.99 mills per KWH.
The ECC estimate, however, included no allowance for the
cost of the backbone transmission system needed to transmit
power from the alternative peaking power plant. Therefore,
the Federal Power Commission adjusted the ECC pumped storage estimate to $16.82 per kilowatt per year plus 2.99
mills per KWH, equivalent to a rate of 22.2 mills per KWH.3^
Using the Federal Power Commission's figures for the
oost of power from the most economical alternatives, the
total annual power benefit was calculated for the Staff
report ae followsi
Maine load factor power
Capacity:

100,000 kilowatts
at $23.50 per kilowatt per year
Energy:
351.6 gigawatt-hours 3 6
at 3.1 mills per K»VH
Total Maine load factor power benefit
3

$2,350,000
1.090.000
$3,440,000

*U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 403.
35
Ibid., p. 404.
36
One gLgawatt-hour = 1,000,000 kilowatt-hours.

.Boston peaking power
Capacity*
Energy:

623,500 kilowatts
at $19.50 per kilowatt per year
594.5 gigawatt-hours
at 4.5 mills per KWH

Total Boston peaking power benefits
Downstream energy benefits
Energy:
175 gigawatt-hours
at 3.0 mills per K.VH
Total Power Benefits

$12,158,000
2.675.000
$14,833,000

525.000
$18,798,000

The "downstream" energy benefits would derive from the
350 gigawatt-hours per year of additional energy produced
by the hydroelectric plants located on the St. John River
in Canada, as a result of the increased natural storage on
the Upper St. John River provided by Dickey-Lincoln. In
accordance with the draft treaty with Canada of May 1966,
the United States is entitled to one half the downstream
benefits, or 175 gigawatt-hours per year, valued at 3.0
mills per kilowatt-hour at that time.
Project Payout Schedule
In order to compute the rates to be charged for power
from Dickey-Linooln, the amount of the total project cost
allocated to power must first be determined.

The rates

charged must be suffioient to pay back the Treasury an
nprpmi amount for fifty years to compensate the government
for its power investment.

The oosts allocated to flood

oontrol and area redevelopment are non-reimbursable, that
is, power rates are not required to reoover the government
3

U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 408.
38
Ibid., p. 409.

Investment in the non-power aspects of the project*

In

1966, using the latest cost estimates for Dickey-Lincoln,
the Department of the Interior calculated that 96.2?£ of the
total project costs should be allocated to power. The
annual project costs for power based on a 50—year period of
analysis, at 3 1/8interest, including transmission, operation and maintenance costs, was determined by the Department of the Interior to be $13,821,400.
Proposed at market payout schedule
Annual capacity: Maine - 100,000 kilowatts
at 315 per kilowatt per year
Boston - 623,500 kilowatts
at $15 per kilowatt per year

$1,500,000
9,352,000

Annual energy:

Maine - 438 gigawatt hours
at 3.0 mills per
KWH
1,314,000
Boston - 672.5 gigawatt hours
at 3.0 mills per
KWH
2.017.500
Subtotal
$14,184,000
Less: Interior
and marketing
costs of administrative
30.50 per kilowatt
per year
361.750
Annual project cost allocated to power
$13,822,250
Department of the Interior Proposed Marketing

Plan

Electric power generated by Dickey-Lincoln would be
marketed by the Department of the Interior, its authority as
marketing agent based upon the Flood Control Act of 1944.
The rates charged for power must be the lowest possible that
are adequate to recover the costs of producing and transmitting the power, Including the amortization of the capital
•S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 4JL4.
40

Ibid., p. 415.

investment allocated to power. The 1944 law also states
that preference in the sale of suoh power shall be given
to public bodies and cooperatives 41
Flans to market Dickey-Lincoln power are based on the
projected needs of New England at the time the project
would become operational.

At the time of the Staff report,

Interior hod not officially discussed marketing plans with
either preference customers in Maine or with private utilities in Massachusetts.

42

Of the Dickey-Lincoln project's total capacity of 794
megawatts. Interior planned to sell 100 megawatts of 50£
load factor power (100 megawatts of capacity generating
energy for 12 hours each day) to preference customers in
Maine•

In 1965, there were two rural electric cooperatives

and six municipal systems in Maine, with a peak demand of
21,695 kilowatts. 4 3

It was projected that by 1975 the

Maine preference customers demand would double, to 44,000
kilowatts.

The remaining 50$ load factor power would be

offered to Maine private utilities on a withdrawable basis
until 1985 when. Interior predicted, Llaine preference customers would be able to use the total 100 megawatts allotted to them.

44

The major part of Dlckey-Llncoln*s capacity, 625 megawatts, would be sold as peaking power at 10# load factor
(625 megawatts of capacity generating energy for approximately two and one half hours each day) to private utility
•Congress, public Works Appropriations for 1968,
op. clt», p. 420*
44
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companies in the Boston area.^

The Federal Power Commis-

sion, in 1965, predicted that this peaking power capacity
would be needed in Bew England by 1975. over and above

the

new capacity planned by the private utilities in 1965.
Under the Interior marketing plan, the lowest rates
at which Dickey-Lincoln power could be sold would be, (at
1965 prices), $15 per kilowatt per year for capacity plus
3.0 mills per KWH for energy-

This cost is equivalent to

a "total cost" of 6.4 mills per KWH for 50£ load factor
power, delivered to load centers in Bangor and Portland
345-kilovolt transmission lines.^

The lowest total charge

to Maine preference customers for Dickey-Lincoln power would
be approximately 8.0 mills per KWH, after adding 1.5 mills
per KWH for "wheeling" charges.

In 1966, it was reported that

Maine Rural Electric Associations and municipal systems
paid from 11.0 mills per KWH to 19.0 mills per KWH, buying
47

most of their energy from the private utilities*
The lowest total cost for Dickey-Lincoln peaking power,
(at 10^ load factor), sold in the Boston area, was estimated
in 1966 to be 20.1 mills per KWH, not including wheeling
48
charges.

The Federal Power Commission, in 1966, estimated

that the lowest cost pumped-storage alternative could produce 10$ load factor power in the Boston area for 26.8
yea

mills perplus
KWH,4.5
based
on per
charges
of 319.50
49 kilowatt per
for capacity
mills
KWH for
energy.per
Congress, Public works Appropriations for 1968.
Ibid., p. 421. ^g
4
?Ibid., P. 407. , q I b i d " p '
Ibid., p. 404.

Although the majority of private utilities in the
Boston area told the Staff that they were not interested
in Dickey-Lincoln peaking power at the forecasted rates,
the Department of the Interior found that the proposed selling prices for Dickey-Lincoln peaking and baseload power
were lower than the alternative power values supplied by
the Federal Pov.er Commission, and lower than the prices
then paid by Maine preference custoners,

Therefore,

Interior concluded that power from Dickey-Lincoln would be
marketable since private utility companies are required to
buy power from the least expensive source available.
The Staff report indicated that an alternative market
for Dickey-Lincoln peaking power would exist. Municipal
electric systems in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont stated their willingness to buy, by 1975, over 600
51
megawatts of peaking power from Dickey-Lincoln. ' The
Municipal Electric Association of Liassachueetts, representing 39 of the 40 Massachusetts municipal systems, told the
Staff that in 1965 their systems had a combined peak of
500 megawatts, and that they had purchased 1,900 glgawatthours of energy. In 1965, the peak projected for these
•52 An—
Massachusetts systems by 1975 was 1,100 megawatts. ^
cording to the Municipal Electric Association, in 1966 thsir
systems paid an average of 12.0 mills per KWH, while the
average national wholesale rates were 4.9 mills per KWH
53
for power sold to municipals.
.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 421.
51
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Significance of Dickey-Lincoln in Reducing Power Rates
Dickey-Lincoln's effectiveness in reducing the
of electricity to Maine and New England ratepayers lies at
the core of the continuing controversy over the project*
Rates paid by all classes of electric consumers in New
England are among tho highest in the country, according to
the Federal Power Commission, and at present 98^ of the
power sold in New England is produced by private utility
companies. New England's investor-owned utilities contend
that the problem of high power rates would not be solved
by pubic power projects, but by improving the efficiency
of power generation by constructing an integrated system
of modern power plants interconnected with extra-high-voltage transmission lines. In 1966, the ECC told the Subcommittee Staff that with this type of planning they would
produce power at less cost than Dickey-Lincoln could, and
sell it at rates 405$ lower than the rates predicted for
Dickey-Lincoln power by 1980. 5 4

The Federal Power Commis-

sion , in its 1964 National Power Survey, also forecasted a
reduction in New England power rates in the 1970's of 30?.,,
resulting largely from increased consumption of electricity.
But, the ECC admits it is almost impossible to predict
future retail electricity prices, because " . . . even
though the costs of power generation may be lowered, and the
costs of power to the consumer reduced with greater consumption of power, these advantages may bo offset by the demand
5

*U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. oit., p. 423*

for underground transmission facilities and other unpredictable and costly condition of power service."

that

^

the Federal project could produce pow

than comparable private projects then being constructed or
planned for New England*

Thepreferencecustomersof

Maine would benefit most directly and substantially if that
proved to be true, since the 100 megawatts ofbaseload
power generated by Dickey-Lincoln would fulfill an increasingly greater proportion of the needs of the preference
systems.

The 1965 Maine preference customers peak demand

of 21,695 kilowatts

was, however, only a small fraction

of the 604,599 kilowatt peak experienced in 1963 by the
three major private utilities of Maine.

Therefore, the

projected low rates for Dickey-Lincoln power would directly
affect the rates of a relatively small number of Maine
electric consumers.

According to the Subcommittee Staf

the Department of the Interior conceded that the availability of low-cost power from Dickey-Lincoln would have
• • only a nominal, if any, effect on the power rates of
consumers in the Boston area if Dickey-Lincoln project peakKft
ing power is sold to the private utilities."
The reason
for this is simples

private utilities would mix " . . . the

relatively small amount of Dickey-Lincoln purchased power
with a very large amount of power from other sources and
sell the power to a large number of customers. The econoqy
S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. cit., p. 425.
?0
* Ibid., p. 416
''ibid., p. 419
Ibid., p. 426.

of price realized in the purchase of Dickey-Lincoln peaking power is, therefore, widely dispersed and will have
little effect on the Individual consumers."
The "New England Business Review" reached a similar
conclusion:

". . .the impact of new power—whether public

or private—on electric bills of ultimate ratepayers will
be significant, but . . . the difference in impact of public
power proposals compared with industry plans will not be
significant for the region as a whole." 6 0

The fact that

the rates charged for electricity by the Maine and New
England private utilities have not decreased as was predicted in the 1960's, but have instead dramatically increased in the 1970•s, does not nullify these conclusions
since increasing rates of inflation have escalated costs
for the Dickey-Lincoln project. Therefore, the rates
charged for Dickey-Lincoln power would be increased to reflect increasing costs in any future project payout
analysis.
If the Department of the Interior were able to work
out plans for the sale of Dickey-Lincoln peaking power to
Massachusetts preference customers, the rate reducing effect of Dickey-Lincoln power might be more marked. This
change in the marketing plan would not produce reductions,
however, for the average Maine ratepayer. The "New England Business Review" suggested a redesign of the proposed
project to better serve the needs of the inland power
.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. olt., p. 426.
®°Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments!
Part IIt op. cit., p. 16.

market of northern New England, to maximise the ratereducing effects and minimize the dilution effects by concentrating the Dickey-Lincoln power market*

In place of

the plan to size the installed capacity of Dickey-Lincoln
for the production of peaking power at close to COO megawatts, the "Business Review" study recommended the installation of capacity adequate for the generation of baseload
power primarily*

^

The installed capacity of Dickey-Lincoln for peaking
power would be comparable to the size of most of the units
now being installed in New England*

If planned for base-

load power production, the Dickey-Lincoln Installation would
be considerably smaller, probably closer to 200 megawatts,
Its size limited by the relatively low flows of the St* John
River. Acceptance of the Northfleld Mountain project as a
valid alternative to Dickey-Lincoln led the "Business Review" to conclude, "It seems unlikely * * .that a market now
exists in southern New England for the 700,000 kilowatts of
peaking power in the present Dickey-Lincoln plan, unless
rates are set below a level to recover costs."
The Staff report states (and the 1964 Department of the
Interior report also recognized this fact) that, although
Dickey-Lincoln could be built for less than any privatelyfinanced alternatives, the Federal government could generate
power at less cost than Dickey-Lincoln by other means with
Federal financing,
6

62

Nuclear steam, conventional steam, or

Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments!
op* cit., p.15.
op* oit., p. 427*

Part II,

pumped storage hydro plants could all be constructed at less
oost and produce power that could be marketed at lower rates
than Dickey-Lincoln, according to the 1966 analysis,

The

Department of the Interior, however, has argued that DickeyLinooln should be considered a multi-resource development,
as well as an electric generating projeot, and that none of
the alternates, Federally or privately financed, could provide the non-power benefits offered by the Dickey-Lincoln
project*

There is no indication that the efficiency of

alternative means of providing area redevelopment objectives,
with Federal assistance, has bsen explored*
Pumped storage was ruled out by the Corps of Engineers
as an acceptable alternative to Dickey-Linooln peaking power*
According to the Federal Power Commission, while DickeyLincoln and pumped storage are equivalent in many ways, conventional hydroelectric projects such as Dickey-Lincoln have
certain advantages over pumped storage*

For reliability of

service, it is important that some part of the generating
capacity of any system be able to assume additional loads
qulokly. Hydroelectric power is best suited to providing
rapid peaking capacity and almost instantaneous reserve for
load protection 24 hours a day, while steam plants are only
useful for baseload operation because they load slowly*
Dickey-Lincoln's large volume of usable power storage
allows for flexibility of operation for baseload reserve
production as well. Pumped storage plants, on the other
hand, require 3 KWH of pumping energy to produce 2 KWH
Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968.
op* cit*, p. 399*
64
lbid., p. 437.

of peaking energy and are unavailable for reserve capacity
during the pumping phase.

Conventional hydroelectric

plants are also subject to fewer interruptions for repairs
and maintenance, as compared with other types of generating
units, because of the use of rugged machinery operating at
low speeds and temperatures. ^
The Federal government could produce energy for about
one half the cost, in every instance (steam, nuclear,
pumpedstorage),of power produced by private companies.
The Department of Commerce, in its 1965 review of the
Dickey-Lincoln project, compared the capital cost of constructing Dickey-Lincoln with the capital costs of other
types of plants.

The capital cost of Dickey-Lincoln, on a

cost per kilowatt of Installed capacity basis was $277* per
kilowatt; for a steam-electric in Boston, $125* per kilowatt; for steam electric in Maine, $140. per kilowatt; and
for nuclear steam, $130. per kilowatt. The lowest capital
cost alternative for the production of peaking power was
68
pumped storage at $196. per kilowatt.
Operating costs
for fuel and maintenance tend to equalize the costs of
power produced by these plants with the cost of DickeyLincoln power but, if Federally financed, their power would
still be less expensive. In 1966, the Federal Power Commission predicted that, in 1975, when Dickey-Lincoln
would theoretically be producing power for $15* per
6
^U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. oit., p. 427.
66
67
Ibid.
Ibid.t p. 395.
^ O.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President
Lyndon B. Johnson. July, 1965, U.S.Department of Commerce
Review, p. 4.

^

kilowatt per year plus 2.4 mills per KWH. With private
financing, the same power was predicted to cost $26.50 per
kilowatt per year plus 2.4 mills per KWH. Pumped storage,
federally financed and in the Boston area, it was predicted,
would be marketed for $8. (in 1975) per kilowatt per year,
and 4*5 mills per kilowatt-hour, but the same project with
private financing would require rates of $19.50 per kilowatt per year plus 4.5 mills per kilowatt-hour.
The gap between the cost of equivalent Federally financed and privately financed electric power is a result of
the higher Interest rates and Federal, state, and
taxes which private utilities are obliged to pay. The interest rate for Federal waterresourceprojects,in 1966,
was 3 l/8£ while private utilities were paying Interest
ratee of 7/*.

Federal projects aire completely tax exempt,

but private utilities pay 15,^ of their gross revenues in
Federal income taxes alone, and are subject to state sales
taxes and local property taxes on plant and transmission
facilities.

Private utilities have the additional oost of

dividend payment to investors.
While any untaxed, Federally-financed power development oan probably lower costs to ratepayers to some degree,
or help to stabilize rising electric bills, in choosing a
tax-free project in place of a private invest: jnt, the
taxes are foregone that the private project would have paid.
Local and State servioes, however, must still be supported.
Therefore, to the extent that Investments by private
•Congress, Public V.'orka Appropriations for 1968.
op* oit., p. 399*
70
Ibid.

utilities are displaced or deferred, the on-going tax burden is shifted to other taxpayers who arc also electric
71

ratepayers. '

The benefit-cost method of determining

economic feasibility has no provision for measuring the net
benefit or cost resulting from the loss of tax revenue versus the gain to ratepayers from lowered eleotrio bills. A
large part of the taxes paid by private utilities go to local communities where the power facilities are located, so
that the dollar benefits from taxes paid are not as widespread as would be the dollar benefits of lower cost power
from tax-exempt sourcee. In the oase of Dickey-Lincoln,
any benefits of lower-cost power would be concentrated in
the preference customers market in Maine, and it has not
been established that rates would be lowered to the extent
that the stimulative effect of low-cost power on the economy would compensate for the tax loss.
A Maine private utility official pointed out, during
the 1965 Congressional hearings on Dickey-Lincoln, that
the construction of the Federal project would cost approximately $7,650,000 annually In taxes. Eased on annual revenue of $15,000,000 for Dickey-Lincoln, its tax-exempt
status would cost $2,250,000 per year In Federal taxes and
$3,000,000 in State sales taxes. Since investor-owned utilities, in 1965, paid property taxes of $1.80 per kilowatt
each year in unorganized townships, the tax on the capacity of 794,000 kilowatts at Dickey-Lincoln would amount
71

Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developmental
Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", ITew Kn/rland Business
Review. April, 1S66, op. cit., p. 11.

to $1,437,000 per year.

The exemption of 300 miles of

double circuit transmission lines worth more than $65
million, normally taxed at 1.5^, would oost $954,000 each
year in property tax revenues.

72

Almost no mention of the comparability test of economic feasibility is made in the Staff's report on DickeyLincoln.

Although, in 1966, the Corps of Engineers

assigned Dickey-Lincoln a favorable benefit-cost ratio,
73
1.91, and an acceptable comparability ratio of 1.12,
the adjustments made by the Department of the Interior in
project costs subsequently reduced the benefit-cost ratio
to 1.59. Adjusting the comparability ratio in the same
manner reduces it from $11,605,000 t $10,390,0007* or 1.12,
to about $11,100,000 i $12,172,400, or less than unity.
Thus, it would seem that in 1966 all the tests for economic justification were not met by Dickey-Lincoln.
72

Bangor Daily News. August 17, 1965.
" o . s .Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968.
op. oit., p. 441.
7
*Ibid.

PART 71

Current Planningi

North Atlantic Regional Water
Resources Study

The North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Coordinating Committee, in May 1972, published a massive report
oovering the availability of water supplies from llaine to
Virginia. Analyses and recommendations for the St. John
River Basin are included.

In October 1972, a "Draft En-

vironmental Impact Statement" was issued assessing environmental effects of the program proposed for the St. John.
This draft was prepared in response to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969» wliich requires an evaluation of potential environmental impacts due to major Federal actions.

The Implementation of the Dickey-Lincoln

project is one of the recommendations made in the Water Resources Study.
The North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study is
part of a program of study of all the major river basins
in the United States grouped into twenty regions. This
program was established by the Water Resources Council,
whloh was created in 1965» under the Water Reeources Planning Act, to coordinate the activities of the Federal,
State, and local agencies engaged in planning the use of
water resources. 1

The North Atlantic Region (NAR) study

was directed by the Army Corps of Engineers, jut the final
authority in the planning process was the Coordinating

^North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordinating Committee, North Atlantic Regional Water Resources
Study. Appendix A, History of Study, toy, 1972, p. A-l.

Committee*

The membership of this body included interest-

ed Federal agencies, all tho States within the HAR, and
the existing river basin commissions.

The study attempts

to project needs and solutions through tho year 2020*
Three general planning objectives are taken into account:
1) National Efficiency
2) Environmental Quality
3) Regional Development ^
A "Draft Environmental Impact Statement" (DEIS) was
prepared for each of the twenty-one Areas within the NAR,
from the St. John River Basin to the James River Basin*
Area #1 consists of the 7,360 square miles of the St. John
River basin located in Maine*
Por this Area, a program emphasizing equally the objectives of Environmental Quality and Regional Development
was recommended in order to ". • .protect and in some ways
improve this Area's extensive wildlands while helping to
A
stimulate industrial growth."
The water resource management program recommended should, therefore, "• . .preserve
the Area's extensive scenic and recreational resources, especially in Sub-area 1-a [the western portion of the basin/
by limiting their economic development and maintaining their
quality*" ** In keeping with the dual objective, however,
it is recommended that "This preservation should be done in
such a way, however, to allow the increasing needs of indus6
try to be met . . •"•
^Torth Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordinating Committee, Annex to Report. Kay, 1972, op. cit., p.5.
3

Ibid., p. 22.

4

Ibid.5Ibid.

6

Ibid., p.23*

The needs considered most important for attaining the
so-called "mixed" objective are listed as "• . .fish and
wildlife, water recreation, recreational boatins, publicly
supplied water, agricultural irrigation, and industrial
self-supplied water," ^ the need for water quality maintenance being considered the key element in all cases. It
is further stated that "Preservation and maintenance of
unique landscapes will be necessary for meeting the visual
and oultural needs. Provisions of such landscapes depends
upon the retention and extension of the Area's unique wilo
derness and wild streams."
And on hydroelectric power:
"Power plant cooling and hydroelectric generation needs will
beoome relatively large during the later years of the planning period due to the growth of the paper industry and to
q
the increase in power exportation from the Area." * This
last statement is particularly confusing since any increase
in power exportation will be due to an increase in generating facilities Installed in the Area.
Although hydroelectric "needs" appear to be of low
priority• the construction of "Dickey-Lincoln Lake", Is persistently advocated in the Water Resources Study* Yet, it
is acknowledged in the DEIS that, of all the programs recommended for the St. John River Basin, "The largest and
most widespread adverse environmental effeots would result
ftrom the construction of Dickey-Lincoln Lake project." 1 0
''North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordinating Committee, Annex to Report, May, 1972, pp.cit., p.22.
9
Ibid.
Ibid., p.23.
*®North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordinating Committee, Draft' Environmental Iupact Statement,
"Area 1 - St. John xttver Basin", October, 1972, p. 3.

The losses of wildlife habitat, cold water fish habitat,
the creation of a barrier to wildlife migration routes, and
the poor aquatic and terrestrial edge habitat that would be
caused by tho instability of reservoir water levels are
recognized in the DEIS, but without any indication that
their significance for the region, as woll as for the immediate project area, is appreciated by the project planners*
Some confusion surrounds the effect of the DickeyLincoln project on the Allagash. 1 1

In the DEIS concern is

Implied about whether the reservoir would bo backed up
above Allagash Falls (". . .the downstream portion of the
Allagash River will bo submerged.")

The size of Lincoln

School Reservoir and, therefore, the generating capacity of
there-regulatingdam, is severely restricted by the height
of these Falls. Any plans to utilize more fully the hydroelectric potential of the Allagash flows would encroach
upon the Wilderness Waterway.
The Water Resources Study reflects a now approach to
the promotion of Dickey-Lincoln by the Army Corps of Engineers*

The hydroelectric project is referred to as being

primarily a multiple-purpose storage project which would
". . .directly or indirectly fulfill a broad array of human
needs, among which are hydroelectric power, flood control,
low flow augmentation for water quality, public and industrial self-supplied water and irrigation*"

The Dickey-

Richard Rothe, New England River Basins Commission,
"Memorandum: Comments on IT Ah Draft Environmental Impact
Statement"* December
1972.
i2
North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordinating Committee, op. cit., p* 11.
13
Ibid.# p. 8.

Lincoln project, authorized in 1965, was credited with benefits from only two of these sources, hydroelectric power
and flood control.
While it is admitted that most of the noeds cited
above could be met by other water management devices such
as small upstream impoundments, it is stated

. .fulfill-

ment of hydroelectric power generation and water quality
maintenance needs all require a mainstream reservoir by the
year 2000." 1 4

In addition, such a reservoir cculd

. .

reduce the initial capital investment that would be nccessary for the individual needs of water quality maintenance,
hydroelectric power generation, irrigation water, recreational boating, water recreation • •

^

Dickey-Lincoln

Is depicted as being not only necessary to meet energy needs
of the future, but also as having the potential to fulfill,
in a single multi-purpose project, many other future water
resource needs.

In the absence of a large mainstream reser-

voir to meet the predicted demands, the development of several single-purpose devices might cumulatively cost more
than the Dickey-Lincoln project, according to the Water Resources Study.

This attempt to broaden the cost basis of

Dickey-Lincoln may be valid if the projections of the future
water resource needs are sound. However, the need for some
Of these services, such as extensive agricull jral irrigation in northern Maine, is open to debate.

*%orth Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordinating Committee, Annex 1 to Report, p. 25.
15
Ibid.

A thread of unresolved conflict between the need for.
the services of a large multiple purpose reservoir on the
Upper St. John and the need to preserve the area for its
wilderness values, runs throughout the Water Resources
Study and DEIS study of the western portion of the Upper
St. John River-

According to the DEIS, "Area 1 contains

• • .the only remaining large wilderness area in the North
Atlantic Region.%

The

Water Resources Study states

that "the mixed objective plan stresses a preservation approach to most of the area, recognizing its unique wilder17
ness value."-

' In the light of these statements, the

recommendation for the construction of the Dickey-Lincoln
dam, or any other "large mainstream reservoir" which would
physically obliterate the core of this wilderness, seems
downright contradictory-

But, the Water Resources Study

also states "This Area has the only reservoir storage site
in the North Atlantic Region which combines a large capacity for in-stream power generation18
with a large amount of
permanent storage for other needs."
According to the
Coordinating Committee, the Upper St. John River is the
last reservoir site remaining in the Northeast with large
hydro potential. 19
The negative environmental effects of Dickey-Lincoln
cited in the DEIS would seem to far outweigh the benefits,
since each of the "needs" which would be met by the power
16

North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordinating Committee, Annex 1 to Report, op. cit., p. 21.
17
{bid., Draft Environmental Impact Statement, p.11.
18
Ibid., Annex 1 to Report, P'23*
^Ibid., Appendix P-Power. p. P-57.

dam and reservoir oould be fulfilled by other means at
other sites, inoluding the generation of electric power.
Nevertheless, the fact oannot be ignored that, if eaoh of
the "needs" identified for the St. John River Basin in the
Water Resources Study is valid and must be met, they will
be fulfilled at other sites if the Dickey-Linooln project
is not built, and the alternative devices will aleo have
some effect on the environment, possibly cumulatively Dore
damaging than Dickey-Lincoln.

The environmental impact

statement is a draft, and is, presumably, subject to
change. Re-evaluation of that portion of the DSIS dealing
with Dickey-Lincoln has been recommended by the I.Taine
State Planning Office.

20

Philip tf. Savage, Maine State Planning Director, correspondence with Harry E. Schwarz, Executive Secretary North
Atlantic Division, Corps of Engineers, December 11, 1972,
p. 1.

Conclusion - Die key-Lincoln in the 1970's r-nd the Prospects
for the Upper St. John River
Because Congress has annually refused appropriations
since 1967, the Dickey-Lincoln project is generally thought
to be a "dead" issuo.

The North Atlantic Regional Water Re«

sources Study indicates, on the

contrary,

that from the cur-

rent perspective of the Corps of Engineers, Dickey-Lincoln
Is very much alive as the key feature of a comprehensive
water resources development program for the St. John River
Basin.

Furthermore, the "Hathaway plan", proposing a small-

er-scale Federal hydroelectric installation and revised marketing plan with agricultural irrigation included as an
additional non-power project benefit, has won over much of
the former Congressional opposition to Dickey-Lincoln.
Also, proponents of the creation of a Power Authority of
Maine have not ruled out a St. John hydroelectric project.
Its predecessor, the 1965 proposal for a Kaine Power
Authority, was based on well-developed plans for a hydroelectric dam on the St. John River at Big Rapids, a few
miles above the Dickey site.
Other types of development may pose a future threat
to the Upper St, John wilderness as well. Although paper
company domination of the watershed has been largely responsible for its present unsettled wilderness state, unsound timber harvesting practices and recreational development of timberland holdings could be as damaging to the
wild qualities of the area as a hydroeleotric project.
A combination of circumstances currently prevails

JLU X
which tends to make Dickey-Lincoln hydroelectric energy
more attractive than ever. Despite the achievement of
many private utility goals for integrating new England's
electric systems, the rate reductions predicted in the mid1960*8 for Maine have not materialized.

Instead, rate in-

creases of approximately 9$ were granted in 1972 hy the
Maine Public Utilities Commission to the three major private elcctric utilities serving Maine. Additional substantial increases will probably be requested in 1974. Fuel
shortages resulting in rising fuel prices and uneasiness
about overdependence on foreign oil supplies may revive interest in the reliable qualities of hydro power. Delays in
nuclear plant licensing and increasing difficulty in siting
thermal and nuclear power plants tends to increase the
appeal of the already-authorized Dickey-Lincoln project to
those concerned about the inadequacy of utility company
plans for meeting future demands.

The natural advantages

of the use of a "clean", renewable resource such as hydro
power versus methods of power production entailing the consumption of fossil fuels and the attendant pollution problems add further attraction to Dickey-Lincoln.

In addition,

some environmentalists have advocated the Dickey-Lincoln
project on the grounds it would give !-!aine the electrical
self-sufficicncy to resist the anticipated wa-e of construction in Maine of huge generators primarily intended to produce power for export south to theflewEngland Power Pool
network.

1

^Editorial, Maine Timos. September 6, 1971.

The original objective of developing the DickeyLincoln project was to reduce the exceptionally nigh Kew
England power rates. Yet it is not clear, on the basis of
the economic justification used by the Department of the
Interior, and on which Congress authorized the project,
that Dickey-Lincoln is the most efficient means of achieving that objective, or that Dickey-Lincoln power would
have any impact on the average Maine ratepayer's electric
bill, because of the marketing restrictions on Federally
developed power. And, if rate reduction is the most important consideration, perhaps a combination of closer Public
Utilities Commission regulation of the private electrical
Industry and an extension of the tax subsidies to private
utilities from which public projects automatically benefit
would achieve that purpose more quickly, on the other hand
rate reductions accomplished by tax subsidy for private or
public power developments do not necessarily bonefit tho
ratepayer-tax-payer.

A new economic analysis of Dickey-

Lincoln, taking these factors into account, cased on current costs and prices, would be required to demonstrate its
current economic justification.
The question then arises as to whether Dickey-Lincoln
power could be integrated with private industry p^ans for
improving the efficiency of power generation, o; if the introduction of competition in a natural monopoly situation
2
may not come at a sacrifice in efficiency.
Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments:
Part II . . -Public Power Proposals", op. cit., p. 17.

the NEP00L (New England Power Pool) agreement, awaiting ap-

proval by the Federal Power Commission, would barpubliclymission grid developed by New England*s private utilities,

which is crucial tointersystemelectrical coordinatio

Dickey-Lincoln was planned and authorized before the
days when environmental impact was a major concern. A reappraisal of the entire project should seriously weigh the
environmental and social cost of obliterating "the irreplaceable natural resource of the present St. John River
watercourse and its adjacent 88,600 aores of streams and
timbered beauty", 4 which provide a natural reserve area
for Maine wildlife, a valuable timber industry resource,
and a high-quality natural recreational area of growing
value to the urban Northeast
But, if the Federal project is not built, the growing
power market will demand that the electricity be supplied
by other means. Since every means of electrical generation
currently in use has inherent environmental costs, to reject Dickey-Lincoln is to shift the environmental looses
to other sites, where they will take different forms. With
this dilemma in mind, tlie basic question is whether the
Upper St. John is more important for its unique value as an
integral component of the last great wilderness of the
Northeast, or for its value as the last significant hydroelectric site remaining in the Northeaet. This decision
3

Sam Barouch, CCT£EAT, personal interview, February,
1973..
^Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments:
Part II . • . Publio Power Proposals", op. oit., p. 17.

should be made within the framework of a oomprehensive energy policy for the state.

If it is not, construction of the

Dickey-Lincoln projeot would Just be another random, shortterm solution to a predictable, long-term problem.
The North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study recognized the value of the St. John for both purposes, and
reoommended development of its hydroeleotrio potential.
That study reveals an attitude of inevitability toward the
construction of Dickey-Lincoln on the part of the Corps of
Engineers, and a willingness to persevere until funds are
appropriated for the completion of planning. Thus, unless
those who favor the preservation of the Upper St. John's
wilderness values are prepared to fight a perennial battle
indefinitely against Dickey-Llnooln, they must develop an
equally substantial plan to Implement their proposals.
Such a plan, to create a St. John Wilderness Waterway
by Ingenious resolution of the public lots issue, was proposed by Congressman Peter Kyros in February, 1973. The
Upper St. John Ilea entirely within the unorganized townships, except for the Allagash Plantation. When these townships were laid out an area of land, generally 1,000 acres,
was reserved for public ownership, to be ueed for the support of the ministry and the schools after these townships
were settled and had organized local governments. About
1850, timber and grass cutting rights were sold for a nominal sum, to lumber companies on almost all the publio lots.
The potential of the 400,000 acres of publio reserved
lands was brought to the publio's attention in 1972, and
the State Attorney General's Offioe performed a study of

the status of the State's ownership rights and ways by
which the state could reassert its olaims to these lands*
A special legislative Public Lands Committee wae created
in 1973 to hear bills proposing various ways of resolving
the publio lands controversy and to study ways in which
these publio lands could be used to the best advantage of
Maine people*
Sixteen unorganized townships span the length of the
Upper St. John, from Baker Lake to the Allagaeh Plantation*
In all but three of these townships, the public lots are
unlocated. that is, they have never been surveyed and laid
out on the ground. As envisioned by the Kyros plan, theee
unlocated lota would be located along the Upper St. John in
such a manner that they would form a continuous corridor
along either side of the river.

In the three townships

where the public lots have been located previously, relocation of the lots would be necessary*

The width of the

atrip of publio lands would vary from township to township,
since a fixed acreage (1,000 acres) would be divided over
varying lengths of river footage*

The average width of

the strip would exceed 500 feet on either side of the river,
and would n9t be less than 358 feet in any townehip, as calculated in the Kyros plan. Not on^y would this plan protect the Upper St. John River for the people of Maine, but
it would require no expenditure of funds for land acquisition of the approximately 15,690 aores of publio lots
involved.
5fj0OTQ Pflionnn from Congressman Peter Kyros, First District, Maine, Washington Office, Friday, March 23, 1973.

The implementation of the Kyros plan must await the
resolution of the entire issue of the ownership and use of
the public lots. No matter what the special committee recommends, or what course the legislature takes, the publio
lote issue will be finally resolved in the courts, which may
take years. ^
The Maine Land Use Regulation Commission's (LURC)
authority to zone the 10.5 million acres of wildlands in the
unorganized territory has the potential to provide some degree of protection to the Upper St. John. Interim zoning
standards are now being formulated to protect the wildlands
from further unplanned development, based on three land-use
dletriots.

In the protection district, special permits are

required for cutting and development is strictly controlled.
Included in this district would be the lands 250 feet back
from "significant" streams. The interim zoning will be followed by permanent zoning after development of a comprehensive plan.

UJRC zoning would not, however, override a vote

of Congress to fund construction of the Dickey-Lincoln Projeot, nor could it Insure future public use of the adjacent
riverlands.

It is apparent that LURC with its current

authority, cannot Insure the continued availability of this
wilderness area for Maine citizens.
Although it will not be possible to implement the
Kyros plan immediately, it does fulfill the need for a substantial plan and management proposal for the use of the
^Newa Release from Cpngressman Peter t&roe, March 23,
1973, op. cit.

Upper St. John that oan be held up ae a concrete alternative to the Dickey-Lincoln project. Obviously, serious
consideration of protective measures for the St. John is
oertain to spark more vigorous promotion of the project.
The full-scale Dickey-Lincoln project clearly could not coexist with a St. John Wilderness Waterway such as Congressman Kyros proposes.

Whether or not a conflict exists be-

tween the Hathaway plan variation of the Die key-Lincoln
project and the Kyros plan for preserving the St. John will
be demonstrated by the feasibility studies now in progress.
Until engineering studies do demonstrate the degree of conflict, these two proposals must be weighed as alternative
usee of the Upper St. John. Congressman Kyros' creative
approach to the preservation of this remarkable Maine river
through the use of the public lots deserves the attention
end the same consideration that the Dickey-Lincoln project
has received. The Dickey-Lincoln project should not be renewed without a thorough reappraisal of its economic benefit for the people of Maine and its environmental and
social costs.
Hie climate of opinion in Maine favors the DickeyLincoln project as a means of lowering power rates and
stimulating economic growth in the state. These expectations are largely based upon promises made by advocates of
the project, that Dickey-Lincoln would assure low-cost power
for all the people of Maine.

In reality, the vaet majority

of Maine people would receive abeolutely no economic
benefit from construction of the hydroelectric project.
No general reduction in electrical rates would occur

if Diokey-Linooln were built, beoause the relatively email
number of Maine preference customers would be entitled to
receive the 100,000 kilowatts of baseload capaoity . Even
the eouthern New England customers buying Diokey-Linooln
peaking power through private utility distributors would
not find their power rates reduoed since

the new power

would be mixed with large quantities of power from other
sources and the rate-reducing effect diluted substantially.
Vast amounts of inexpensive power from Dickey-Lincoln would
not be generally available, so the project would not serve
to attract industry to Maine.

The evidence that the projeot

is the best way to revitalize the economy of northern Maine
is questionable.

Certainly more effioient means of accom-

plishing this objective could be found than the construction
of a $500 million power development. Also, it is unlikely
that any rate reduction resulting from the project would
be more equitably distributed than the tax increase that
would be generated by the project. Only a limited number
of Maine people (preference customers) would directly
benefit from lower-cost power from Dickey-Linooln, but the
tax burden from whloh the Federal projeot would be exempted
would be distributed over all classes of taxpayers, who
are also ratepayers, but who would not all benefit from
rate reductions.
The environmental consequences of the proposed DiokeyLincoln project would be profound.
would be devastated.

The Upper St. John River

The trout flshezy would be destroyed

in the project area and damaged upstream.

Its value for

wilderness canoe-camping would be nullified. 110,000 aoree
of wildlife habitat would be obliterated by the reservoir,
an area that has been of particular importance as a natural
wildlife reserve.

The displacement of the wildlife inhabit-

ing the project area is expected to have a significant
secondary impact on the populations of animals outside the
immodiate projeot area, causing an over-all decline in
populations of all species in the Upper St. John region.
The most severe blow would be dealt to the deer population,
einoe 13,000 acres of deer yarding areas, which support
deer from the entire region, would be inundated. At the
same time, the Diokey-Lincoln reservoir facility would open
up this section of the wlldlands to greater numbers of
people, increasing hunting and fishing pressures.
In the absence of any demonstrable economic benefits
to Maine people from the construction of the Dickey-Lincoln
projeot, these drastic environmental consequences are tinjustifiable.

The Federal projeot would produoe less than

of New England's total eleotrlcal requirements at the
present time. It would consume, however, the last wild
eeotion of the St. John River, a core area of what hae been
called the only remaining large wilderness in the Northeaet.
The conetruction of the Dickey-Lincoln project on the Upper
St. John River would squander a unique wilderness river,
of ever-increasing value to the people of the etate, the
region, end the nation.
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